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ABSTRACT
This thesis examines the incidence of benefits resulting from downtown development in
Providence, Rhode Island. Despite the acclaim accorded to the recent downtown
development, there have been very few assessments of the project. Drawing on the
critiques of the corporate center approach, which resulted in uneven spatial development
and neighborhood decline, this study establishes a framework for analyzing revitalization
that explicitly addresses whether neighborhood residents have access to the social and
economic benefits conferred by development.
The findings of this study suggest that downtown development in Providence has to some
extent succeeded in repositioning the city as a regional economic and destination center
through the development of tourism and service-based industries. In addition, it has
successfully eradicated the physical characteristics of blight and transformed the
landscape. Nevertheless, analysis of tax revenues demonstrates that the downtown
development has not resulted in a strong net fiscal benefit to the city. Moreover, the
project has failed to link the benefits of development in a direct and systematic manner to
surrounding neighborhoods, particularly low-income communities.
This study suggests strategies for Providence and other cities to ensure a more equitable
distribution of economic benefits from downtown development, as well as ways to
improve project assessment and fiscal returns to the public sector. It concludes by
offering a new model for downtown development that identifies both neighborhood and
downtown outcomes as indicators of successful revitalization..
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INTRODUCTION
Downtown Redevelopment
The attempts of American cities over the last fifty years to revitalize their downtown
districts have been based on the assumption that a thriving downtown is critical to the
functioning and vitality of not just the city, but the region as a whole. While many of
these initiatives have achieved a certain measure of success in attracting new investment
and in transforming the image of blighted areas, the persistence of poverty and
segregation of opportunities in many central cities affirm the need to examine the benefits
conferred by downtown revitalization and to consider new economic development
strategies.
As deindustrialization triggered employment loss and depopulation of cities, and as
suburbia gained in popularity, downtowns across the northeastern United States
deteriorated physically and economically. With the decline of property values and the
erosion of tax bases, increasingly resource-constrained governments found it difficult to
provide services to the growing low income and minority populations in central cities.
For many cities, this limitation of resources prompted and justified downtown
redevelopment strategies that focused on increasing the economic competitiveness of the
city overall. Cities often advocated pro-business or corporate center approaches that
would have multiplier effects on the local economy by stimulating job growth and
generating revenue for the municipality.
However, in failing to address the fundamental causes of decline and in neglecting to link
the benefits of development in the core to the neighborhoods, this approach resulted in
uneven spatial economic development and further neighborhood decline.
By promoting stable neighborhoods so that they can provide labor and house consumers,
cities can help sustain the gains achieved at the center. In this sense, downtown
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development that succeeds as a strategy for revitalization must be based on an
understanding of the symbiotic relationship between the core and the neighborhoods.
The Case of Providence
Downtown Providence, with its riverfront park, gleaming buildings and upscale
restaurants is, for many, the embodiment of successful urban revitalization. An important
commercial center during the industrial revolution that became one of the leading textile
manufacturing bases in the country, Providence declined after World War II as the
economy shifted away from traditional manufacturing and firms relocated to areas with
lower business costs. As employment and residents abandoned the city, retail declined
and the downtown experienced severe disinvestment, the physical signs of which were
evident in vacant buildings and deteriorating infrastructure. Adjacent to the central
business district, the area later known as the Capital Center District faced similar decline;
concrete parking lots, choked roads and blight characterized this former site of railroad
tracks and sidings.
However, massive public and private investment has transformed the degraded
downtown landscape into one that exudes prosperity and vitality. The extensive
development that occurred in the Capital Center district during the eighties and nineties
demonstrated city officials' intense commitment to regenerating the downtown area. The
strategy was not a new one, but it seemed to work. The renovated waterfront area has
attracted private investment and increased tax revenues. Moreover, it has helped
Providence generate one third of the payroll that is taxed by the state, adding up to more
than $4bn a year ("Waterfront Revitalization" 1).
Thus, from the perspective of many city leaders, the business community and residents,
the Capital Center project has been an overwhelming success and has legitimized the next
phase of the renewal. Known as the New Cities initiative, this ambitious plan seeks to
redevelop more than 500 acres of deteriorated industrial property at a cost of billions
(City of Providence 1).
Research Questions
Amidst these glowing testaments of achievement, perhaps lies another story that focuses
on whether public benefits from the substantial amounts of public investment have
extended to Providence's neighborhoods. The question of whether downtown
development has succeeded as a strategy for revitalization should be measured not just in
terms of its impact on downtown property values and revenue generation, but also in
terms of whether neighborhoods - in particular low-income communities - have access to
the benefits of this development.
The notion of access can be examined within a framework that includes economic, social
and political elements. This framework prompts questions such as: who is employed by
the new development, what type of jobs were created, who is using the facilities, and
whether the downtown is generating investment and development beyond the immediate
area. There is also an issue concerning who had the power to influence and share in the
decisions that guided the development process, the extent to which the massive
concentration of resources in the downtown limited the ability of the city to intervene in
the neighborhoods and whether the type of development that resulted met the needs of
residents and the goals of economic development.
These questions are important because there appears to be very little research concerning
the incidence of benefits resulting from the downtown revitalization. Moreover, although
city officials and other observers tout the Capital Center as a success, it is striking that
there have been very few assessments of the project. Though HUD's recent Strategies for
Success report identifies Providence as one of ten cities around the country that have
adjusted to rapidly changing times and excelled, the report fails to evaluate the project
according to its established goals and benchmarks, or in terms of its impact on
neighborhood development (95-98).
This investigation is thus important in that it attempts to fill a gap in research concerning
downtown development in Providence. However, its application is broader since it
establishes a set of objectives that make direct reference to diversifying the benefits from
publicly-initiated projects and uses this as a framework for analysis of revitalization. In
doing so, this study suggests a model for downtown development that cities can adopt in
order to encourage more even spatial development.
Methodology Overview
This study evaluates the downtown development in Providence according to criteria that
address the comprehensive nature of revitalization. Specifically, the project's success in
transforming the physical environment, generating revenue, increasing property values
and private investment are examined. In addition to these more downtown-focused
outcomes, this study assesses the extent to which neighborhoods have benefited from
downtown development by analyzing the users of the project facilities and the level of
formal hiring and community benefits conferred by the project. Finally, the study
examines whether the project has accomplished the goals of city officials and community
leaders.
This investigation relies on a qualitative and quantitative approach to understanding this
issue. The research strategy for assessing each indicator is discussed in greater detail in
Chapter 1. As an overview, this study focuses on analyzing project data, reviewing
planning documents and articles, as well as conducting semi-structured interviews with
key participants. Implicit in the various strategies employed is the understanding that the
notion of revitalization is a complex one that necessitates the synthesis of a diverse set of
approaches. Underlying this research is the notion that the city has neglected to address
the incidence of benefits in what has been deemed a successful case of downtown
redevelopment.
Framework
Chapter 1 examines the decline of the American downtown and the various government
responses this situation elicited. Following urban renewal, many cities adopted a
corporate center approach that focused on reestablishing the downtown as a regional
business and shopping center. The limitations of this approach are discussed within the
context of the need for neighborhood development. The chapter concludes by proposing a
more comprehensive definition of revitalization and how it could be measured.
The experience of Providence in responding to employment and population loss is
detailed in Chapter 2. Faced with a declining downtown, the mobilization of the business
community was critical in shaping the vision for a revitalization downtown. This chapter
describes how the subsequent public private partnership initiated the Capital Center
District project, an ambitious and costly plan that embodied the corporate center
approach to downtown development. Despite the depressed conditions of the
neighborhoods, planning resources converged on the downtown area, ensuring uneven
spatial development.
Chapter 3 presents this study's findings and analysis. The Capital Center project in
Providence is assessed according to its impacts on the downtown area, followed by the
extent to which benefits derived from the physical transformation and generation of new
economic activity have extended to the neighborhoods.
Drawing on these findings and analysis, Chapter 4 concludes with a discussion of the
success of Providence's downtown initiative as a strategy for revitalization. The
corporate center approach of the project is reviewed in the context of the neighborhood
development. This chapter offers recommendations that focus on linking neighborhood to
downtown development in a more systematic manner so as to diversify downtown benefit
provision and so as to directly address economic development needs of low-income
communities. In its conclusion, this chapter highlights lessons from the Providence
experience that can be applied to urban development through the application of a new
model for downtown development.
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CHAPTER 1
DOWNTOWN REDEVELOPMENT
The Decline of the Downtown
"Downtowns are seen as definitive of overall city identity, so cities of all sizes and in all
regions are committed to successful downtown redevelopment" (Robertson 429).
The decline of the American downtown over the last fifty years prompted a series of
redevelopment efforts that sought to reassert the position of the downtown as the center
of regional commercial and cultural activity. The various federal, state and local policies
and programs implemented, reevaluated and amended demonstrate not just the
importance of downtown revitalization as an economic development strategy, but also,
the failure of existing approaches at successfully revitalizing the complex and dynamic
arena of cities.
The deterioration of American downtown districts was inextricably linked to the rise of
suburbia in the 1950s, a trend that continues to prove difficult to reverse. As state and
federal programs funded highway building, preferential mortgage lending, tax breaks to
homeowners and to relocating businesses (Zielenbach 5), and as automobile usage
increased, Americans left the cities in pursuit of new opportunities and improved
standards of living in newly created suburbs.
The move to the suburbs, which was a "relative trickle" (Krumholz 213) before World
War II, rose dramatically after the war and has accelerated further between 1980 and
1990. Perhaps the key factor in determining the fate of cities was the loss of economic
opportunities as technology advanced and the economy responded. Deindustrialization in
central cities, combined with the growth of light manufacturing that favored suburban
locations, resulted in massive job losses in cities that had once enjoyed a competitive
advantage. "As central-city factories closed, blue-collar workers lost good-paying jobs
and seemingly had little hope of success in the new service economy of the postindustrial
city..." (Teaford 302). Between 1980 and 1990, suburbs captured 120 percent of the net
job growth in the manufacturing sector (Hughes and Sternberg qtd. in Krumholz 213).
Moreover, cities began to lose their advantage for office location as suburbs offered an
array of place-based inducements. In 1950, central cities contained 57 percent of
metropolitan-area residents and 70 percent of metropolitan-area jobs. By 1990, central
cities contained only 37 percent of all metropolitan residents and 45 percent of all
metropolitan-area jobs (Krumholz 213).
The statistics, however, conceal the economic, social and physical ramifications of such
marked population loss on the fabric of cities. The flow of affluence and opportunities to
the suburbs, resulted in the concentration of poverty in the cities. As property values
declined and the tax base eroded, city governments were increasingly resource-
constrained, and the pressures of providing services to growing low-income and minority
communities exacerbated this situation. Moreover, suburbs ensured that low-income
households would be restricted to the cities by adopting exclusionary zoning and other
land-use regulations that make housing too costly for the poor (Krumholz 213). Thus, as
suburbs became enclaves of opportunities, central cities were increasingly characterized
by poverty, older neighborhoods, crime, neglected infrastructure, blight and despair.
Government responses to decline
Urban Renewal
Although the response of government to the decline of cities was at times ineffective and
at times detrimental to the already distressed urban environments, the response was
generally swift and dynamic as policymakers sought to revise programs over time.
Galvanized by the federal urban renewal program and the efforts of local growth
coalitions, downtown redevelopment programs flourished in the 1950s (Judd qtd. in
"Downtown Redevelopment" 104). However, the reliance on urban renewal dollars -
which was not a program of direct public investment for revitalization but rather a means
for cities to acquire land through eminent domain and assemble it for sale to private
developers - typically resulted in single downtown projects "designed to stabilize
property values and boost investor confidence in central business districts" such as in
Pittsburgh's Golden Triangle or Baltimore's Charles Center ("Downtown
Redevelopment" 104). Given that private developers sought to maximize profits, and
given that public redevelopment authorities were dependent on developers in initiating
and carrying out these projects, "the upshot was that urban renewal investment was rarely
targeted to cities' most distressed neighborhoods ("Politics" 20).
Corporate Center Approach
By the 1970s, many cities in the Frostbelt area were undergoing deindustrialization and
fiscal distress, which rendered them unable to deal effectively with the deteriorating
conditions of central cities. Their lack of resources prompted a rethinking of urban
policies and justified a new approach to downtown redevelopment that focused on
increasing the economic competitiveness of the city overall rather than promoting
redistributive programs such as affordable housing, which would only serve to attract
more low-income individuals and families (Zielenbach 6). In this context, the presence
of a more "politicized business community" influenced cities to embark upon a more
"entrepreneurial" strategy of economic development ("Downtown Redevelopment" 104)
and many cities began to advocate a pro-business or corporate center approach.
The physical consequences of this approach were revealed as cities attempted to distance
themselves from their manufacturing pasts and reinvent their downtowns as glittery
destinations for upscale consumers, particularly tourists, "...the future of urban America
was not in factories but in service, and one of the service industries most pregnant with
possibilities was tourism" (Teaford 274). Thus, beginning in the 1970s and extending into
the 1980s and 1990s, cities built hotels, tourism-convention facilities, high-end
residences and corporate centers in their downtowns in an attempt to transform their
decaying images and attract the mobile capital of the new economy.
Of particular note was the "Rouse-ification" of downtowns as the Rouse company built
festival marketplaces across the country in cities such as Boston, New York, and
Baltimore to name a few ("Politics" 24). These marketplaces not only improved the
physical appearance of downtowns, but also contributed to the growth of the hospitality
industry, which relied on large numbers of unskilled workers - an asset in abundance in
older cities. For many mayors across the North East, this approach seemed to be the
panacea for their urban woes: "older cities could come back if they became exciting
magnets for the tourist dollar" (Teaford 274).
The arguments for adopting this corporate center approach, as outlined by Levine in
"Downtown Redevelopment as An Urban Growth Strategy," focused on the provision of
four main public benefits (104):
1) Symbolic Enhancement of the Local Business Climate: ostentatious downtown
revitalization projects would enhance the public sector's ability to leverage private
investment by attracting potential investors to a city undergoing positive change.
2) Direct Job Creation and Tax Base Broadening: new employment opportunities would
boost the economy, offset job losses in the manufacturing sector and create entry-
level positions for low-income residents. In addition, new commercial development
would augment property values and broaden the city tax base, which would increase
revenues and the capacity of the city to provide public services.
3) Ripple Effects: once a "critical mass of downtown investment is leveraged," it would
stimulate economic growth in the rest of the city through spill over or trickle down
effects. This argument, combined with the benefit of direct job creation and tax base
broadening, is critical to understanding how proponents of the downtown-centered
approach could thwart more neighborhood-centered revitalization attempts.
4) Spearheading Economic Adjustment: as the economy became more service-based,
downtown became increasingly attractive as a central location for corporate offices,
which could benefit from the agglomeration tendencies of the advanced services
sector.
Limitations of Corporate Center Approach
However, despite the popularity of these downtown revitalization projects, the quality
and pervasiveness of these benefits - particularly in terms of reaching low-income
communities - is debatable, and may not outweigh the costs. It is important not just to
calculate the aggregate costs incurred by a city in terms of packaging land parcels, selling
them below fair market price, assisting with environmental remediation, offering sales
and property tax abatements or reductions, and funding infrastructure improvements, but
also to consider the cost to surrounding neighborhoods. For, by concentrating its
resources on downtown initiatives, a city is unable to focus on other areas or programs
and thus "neighborhoods have often been neglected" (Keating 3).
The failure of many cities to conduct systematic cost-benefit analyses, to perform
evaluations of public expenditures, or to fully consider alternatives to such a massive
commitment of public resources in relatively small areas, has, for many critics of
downtown development, resulted in uneven urban growth and the persistence of
structural problems facing Frostbelt cities ("Downtown Redevelopment" 105). As city
planning agencies focused on identifying private investment opportunities, many failed to
examine the quality of jobs that would be created and how development opportunities in
the downtown area would be linked to the development needs in surrounding
neighborhoods. Cities made neighborhood development reliant on trickle-down benefits
from central business districts, a policy that fell short of the alleviating conditions in
distressed communities.
Not only did downtown development fail to spill-over into neighborhoods and create
employment opportunities, but the emphasis on tourism-convention and advanced
services industries proved "deficient anchors of a local economy" ("Downtown
Redevelopment" 140).
As Stanback and Noyelle point out, the income distribution in such
economies tends to be two-tiered, with few occupational ladders and middle-
income jobs bridging the tiers. The downtown services sector tends to be
isolated from the local component of a city economy; limited linkages to
small and medium-sized local firms mean that there are few ripple effects in
neighborhood economic development (Stanback and Noyelle 140 -142).
What is more, the kinds of jobs created in downtown corporate centers are
unlikely to provide employment opportunities for urban poor and minorities.
("Politics" 26)
Where downtown development initiatives did create jobs that low-income communities
could access, critics have argued that these jobs tended to be entry-level and paid far less
than the manufacturing jobs they replaced. Indeed, the real winners from revitalization
have been the developers, investors and suburbanites who have filled the quality
employment positions ("Politics" 26).
Moreover, the argument that successful redevelopment would increase revenue and allow
cities to fund social programs is not a persuasive one. According to Levine's
redevelopment studies, there is little evidence to suggest that such redistribution occurs in
Baltimore and other "austerity-minded" cities; instead, "the returns from downtown
growth are generally recycled into further redevelopment activity" ("Politics" 28).
Economic development policies, in particular tax increment financing, contribute to this
uneven spatial investment areas by pledging the tax revenue stream from future
redevelopment to pay for initial construction financed by bonds. This policy only serves
to widen the disparity between downtown and neighborhoods, particularly low-income
communities.
By failing to address both population and employment loss as causes of downtown
decline, the corporate center approach was flawed from the outset. The exclusive focus
on generating new economic activity without attempting to draw residents back to the
city fostered uneven spatial development. Moreover, by not directly linking economic
gains at the center to surrounding communities, the approach guaranteed that downtown
development would occur in isolation and that neighborhoods would deteriorate.
The Case for Neighborhood Development
"Neighborhoods are the lifeblood of any city" (Witold qtd. in Moe and Wilkie 101).
The importance of ensuring that low-income communities benefit from revitalization
efforts is clear. A well-functioning downtown relies on stable neighborhoods that
provide a reliable supply of labor to industry, help lower the costs of business and house
consumers who can afford to consume goods and services. In contrast to suburban
commuters, these inner city communities have a direct stake in the economic and social
health of the city.
By not improving poor communities, cities erode their competitiveness; the existence of
concentrated poverty, crime, and illiteracy, deters investors who seek to locate in areas
with skilled workforces and buying power (Zielenbach 11). These same negative
attributes also discourage potential middle-income residents from locating near
downtown and push existing residents to the suburbs once they have the resources to do
so, thereby contributing to sprawl.
Moreover, inner city decay and its corollary of regional sprawl impose severe costs on
society in terms of infrastructure. Not only does infrastructure in neglected
neighborhoods become obsolete, requiring the municipality to rebuild it at replacement
cost elsewhere in the region, but the costs associated with sprawl are also massive and, to
some extent, unnecessary.
Revitalization
Definition
"In city after city, redevelopment has been associated with a 'tale of two cities': pockets
of revitalization surrounded by areas that experience growing hardship" ("Politics" 25).
While many of the downtown redevelopment initiatives have achieved a certain measure
of success in attracting new investment and in transforming the image of blighted areas,
the persistence of poverty and segregation of opportunities in many central cities affirm
the need to examine the benefits conferred by downtown revitalization and to consider
new economic development strategies.
In order to evaluate what constitutes successful revitalization, it is first necessary to
define the concept within the framework of publicly initiated development projects. Both
the definition and measurement of revitalization are complex, somewhat problematic and
certainly not universally agreed upon.
The most popular approaches to revitalization tend to fall within two categories: people
or individual-based, and place-based (Zielenbach 30). The individual-based approach
assesses the neighborhood wealth in social, psychological and economic terms and relies
on improving local institutional capacity, program development and trickle-down
economic growth as means to achieve revitalization. By placing the emphasis on
individual development, fostering the long-term viability of the neighborhood as a
geographic place becomes less of an important goal than enabling residents to leave the
neighborhood in order to pursue better opportunities elsewhere. Indeed, the outcome of
such an approach could be the further deterioration of the neighborhood as it loses the
social and economic capital of its departing residents.
The place-based approach focuses more on improving the economic viability of the area,
rather than the capacity of the residents in the neighborhood. As such, gentrification,
incumbent upgrading and adaptive reuse constitute revitalization (Zielenbach 23). With
the goal of increasing property values, this approach tends to drive out existing residents
who can no longer afford the increased costs of living. Thus, in contrast to the individual-
based approach, which is a variant on anti-poverty programs, under the place-based
scenario, poverty is displaced not alleviated. The corporate center approach, with its
emphasis on increasing property values through upscale redevelopment, exemplifies a
place-based strategy.
Clearly, any discerning definition of revitalization requires the synthesis of the individual
and place-based approach in order to offer a more holistic understanding of the term.
Improving residents' access to jobs without improving the neighborhood in which they
live essentially undermines comprehensive economic development as residents choose to
relocate to areas that better fit their enhanced economic status. Or, in the case of
downtown development, improving the place by generating new economic activity and
implementing physical improvements does not lead to revitalization if residents lack the
capacity to access new opportunities.
In the case of neighborhood development, Zielenbach comments, "recognizing the
inherent interplay between investment in a neighborhood and improved conditions for
local residents" leads to the following definition of revitalization: "the improvement of
economic conditions for existing residents and the reintegration of the neighborhood into
the market system" (31). While this definition addresses poverty reduction, it does not go
far enough in addressing explicitly the physical aspects of revitalization and it does not
take into account the provision of public benefits and amenities that downtown
development must necessarily confer.
This provision of public benefits as part of what constitutes successful revitalization,
assumes more significance given the role that the downtown plays as the principal place
where people exchange goods and services and enjoy the amenities that the region has to
offer. Downtown revitalization should be framed not just in terms of it operating as a
successful unit, but in terms of the extent to which it serves the city as a whole, especially
the neighborhoods. Thus, while redevelopment should focus on physical transformation,
including the provision of public space and amenities and also on economic
improvements, the benefits of new economic activity should extend to the
neighborhoods. For residents to access these gains, cities must focus on program
development that enables individuals to compete for employment opportunities and not
rely on trickledown as proposed by the corporate center model.
If downtown development is to succeed as a strategy for revitalization, it must address
the fundamental causes of decline. By tackling the loss of population as well as economic
activity, the downtown can reestablish itself as a regional center. Many initiatives have
focused on the economic but neglected the demographic aspect. Implicit in this more
comprehensive approach to revitalization is an understanding of the critical role that
neighborhoods and their residents play in supporting a stable downtown as employees
and consumers. Thus, rather than framing the debate as downtown versus the
neighborhoods, cities should recognize the reinforcing nature of the relationship and
encourage the development of both.
Measurement
Given the complex, multifaceted nature of revitalization, it is necessary to draw on a
range of indicators to determine success. In formulating a framework for analysis, this
study acknowledges the limitations of the corporate center approach, as outlined by
Levine and applies this critique to understanding the case of Providence. Where Levine
focused exclusively on economic impacts, this study attempts to additionally assess
physical and social impacts of revitalization. While Pagan and Bowman in Cityscapes
and Capital do take into account the change in physical appearance and class of user in
their assessment of revitalization, they fail to explicitly address impacts on the
neighborhood or indeed the need for ensuring an equitable distribution of benefits.
By synthesizing the physical and the economic, the downtown and the neighborhood, this
study attempts to supplement the aforementioned approaches with a more detailed set of
objectives shown in figure 1.1 that cities should use in the planning and evaluating of
downtown development projects.
Figure 1.1: Indicators of Revitalization
Project:
- Accomplishment of
city officials objectives
DOWNTOWN Physical
Transformation
- Public space and
amenities
NEIGHBORHOOD Extent to which _
residents access new
uses
Downtown-focused outcomes
In emphasizing physical change and new economic activity, these outcomes reflect to
some extent the goals of the corporate center approach towards downtown development.
1) Change in Physical Appearance of Area: assessing the extent to which the blighted
area has undergone quality physical transformation and created public space and
amenities.
Research Approach: This study sought to compare pre and post revitalization assessor
maps and photographs, as well as draw on impressionistic data collected during
interviews.
Generate New
Economic Activity
- Private investment
- Increase property
values
- Generate revenue
- New employment
- Formal hirings and
community benefits
- Contribution to equitable
spatial allocation of resources
2) Increase in private investment and property values: this impact is not limited to the
specific project area, but extends to adjacent areas and is exemplified through
multiplier effects.
Research Approach: In order to assess levels of private investment, this study relied
on data compiled by the Capital Center Commission, documented in articles and
relayed by key participants during interviews. Although this study initially sought to
use property assessment records in evaluating property values, the reassessment
underway in Providence at the time research was conducted meant that an analysis of
office rents was used as a proxy for this indicator.
3) Net revenue generation: measured using city official's revenue generating benchmark
rather than optimal returns and defined as city revenues from the project exceeding
the public cost of the project.
Research Approach: By comparing early planning documents prior to the
revitalization effort with property assessment records, this study intended to comment
on the success of the project in generating additional tax revenue.
Neighborhood-focused outcomes
In assessing the extent to which project benefits extend to the neighborhoods, this
analysis diverges from the corporate center approach and attempts to establish a more
holistic approach to understanding successful revitalization.
1) Examine diversity of users of project facilities and amenities.
Research Approach: This study used data compiled by researchers as well as
impressionistic evidence relayed by key participants during interviews.
2) Assess formal hirings, types of jobs created and analyzing target population for new
employment opportunities.
Research Approach: Interviews were conducted with key participants, particularly
representatives of community development corporations and data collected from
reports.
3) Evaluating community benefits resulting from project.
Research approach: By conducting interviews with officials from the city, business
and nonprofit sector, this study examined the extent of community benefit provision.
4) Allocation of resources: extent to which downtown development has assisted
neighborhood development, particularly in terms of city resource designation.
Research approach: This study relied on information and data collected during
interviews with city officials and representatives from community
development/finance corporations.
Limitations
Measuring revitalization presents a number of issues that relate to the complicated nature
of the concept. Firstly, it is important to understand that complete data is not easily
obtainable at geographical units smaller than the citywide and zip code level. This
limitation makes it difficult to assess the impact of a redevelopment project alone. Linked
to this is a causal issue in that it is difficult to determine the extent to which the
redevelopment project, and not another factor, caused, for example, an increase in
property values.
There is also an issue in that while accomplishment of city officials' vision and goals
comments on the ability of the city officials to implement a vision, this assumes that the
vision was a good one and that the public was fully represented in its crafting. If this is
not the case, this indicator is invalid as a measurement for successful revitalization.
Revenue generation also presents a problem in that it is based on a cost benefit analysis.
Not only does this assume that the city performs such an analysis, but that, ideally, it also
takes into account the social costs and benefits of a project, which are difficult to
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quantify. It also assumes that the city will channel revenue from the project into social
programs and not merely reinvest the returns from downtown growth into projects that
assist the resource wealthy.
While the tools are not perfect, taken together, they do provide a useful framework to
evaluate revitalization. Given the vast resources that cities have committed to downtown
redevelopment, it seems that attempts to assess the success of these initiatives play an
important role in appraising past policies and in determining future approaches to
economic development.
CHAPTER 2
The CASE for REVITALIZATION in PROVIDENCE
Providence, the capital of Rhode Island is the largest city in the state with a population of
174,000 people (US Census). As the third most populous city in New England after
Boston and Worcester, its economy exerts regional influence as the business, finance,
governmental and cultural center of a metropolitan area of over 1,000,000 persons
(RIEDC 1). Providence boasts a major port, as well as six colleges and universities and is
one of the regional leaders in the production of machinery and jewelry.
Downtown Providence, located at the confluence of the Moshassuck and
Woonasquatucket Rivers and facing the head of the Narangansett Bay, consists of
approximately 150 acres and is surrounded by the College Hill, Smith Hill, Federal Hill
and South Providence neighborhoods (Appendix A). Housing the State Capitol and the
impressive Providence Place Mall, the downtown emanates a monumental quality that
transitions into a dense central business district characterized by historic mid-rise and
more recent high-rise buildings.
Founded in 1636, the city became an important commercial center during the industrial
revolution when it was one of the leading textile manufacturing bases in the country. Its
preeminence in the hierarchy of cities peaked in 1940s as its textile and jewelry industries
boomed and its population numbered approximately 253,000 (Whitmire 22). The signs of
a flourishing economy were evident in Providence's physical environment as resources
poured into new development: "That money financed the construction of beautiful
homes, massive factories, shiny storefronts, and sturdy brick office buildings" (Nifong
25).
Forces of Decline
However, as the industrial age waned after World War II, Providence experienced a
major decline in its economic competitiveness. The shift in the economy away from
heavy manufacturing combined with the locational flexibility of existing and emerging
industries severely impacted the city. Textile and manufacturing businesses closed and
relocated their operations to Rhode Island's suburbs or to the southern states where labor
costs, land, taxes and utilities were cheaper (Motte and Weil 9).
From the early 1950s, the city's manufacturing employment, industrial output and gross
retail receipts declined on a consistent annual basis (Motte and Weil 9). The loss in
employment opportunities precipitated the depopulation of the city and the trend toward
central city disinvestment. Between 1940 and 1970, the city's population declined by
almost 40% as nearly 100,000 residents relocated, primarily in suburban areas of nearby
towns where single-family homes were being built in extensive subdivisions (Motte and
Weil 9).
The impact of losing its manufacturing base was exacerbated by Providence's loss of
retail and service industries. By the early 1970s, surrounding municipalities, capitalizing
on their strategic advantages, had built suburban shopping malls and office parks that
lured business from the city. Just eight miles south of Providence along Interstate 95, two
large suburban malls, the Rhode Island and Warwick, seized an increasing share of the
state's retail dollars (Motte and Weil 9). In 1977, the 45 retail establishments in the
Warwick mall generated sales of $75.1 million whereas the CBD retail sales totaled
$70.9 million (United States 55).
The fact that Providence could also not compete for industries in emerging sectors
compounded the trend toward disinvestment as new resources were channeled away from
the city and into adjacent locations. Suburbs often won state funding for the construction
of business parks that were "tailored toward the reorientation of Rhode Island's economy
to emerging global communications industries" (Motte and Weil 9). The city saw its
share of new commercial construction in Rhode Island decrease from 32 percent in 1967-
68 to 14 percent in 1977-78 (United States 56), and its share of the state payroll decline
from 38.7% in 1970 to 33.4 percent in 1977 (United States 54).
The demise of Providence as a regional center for commerce, and its related population
loss, affected the downtown area, in particular, economically and physically. Between
1972 and 1977, retail sales in the central business district (CBD) decreased by 13.9% and
the number of retail establishments declined from 293 to 255 compared to an overall
increase in Rhode Island retail sales of 37.9% (United States 55). Moreover, the total
number of persons working in the downtown area was estimated at 25,631 in 1977, an
average annual decrease of 2.7% since 1970 when downtown employment was 31, 769
(United States 54). Buildings were boarded up, additional businesses, including the
Biltmore hotel were due to close, and no new development was occurring as investors
"looked elsewhere" (Olson 37). According to Ron Marsella, the first director of the
downtown development oriented Providence Foundation1 "people didn't believe in
Providence" (Interview with Marsella).
Providence in many ways typified the experience of declining central cities that
underwent considerable population loss in the 1970s and 80s, with devastating impacts
upon local economies. Unlike other cities, however, Providence had not only escaped the
implementation and legacy of urban renewal, but also retained significant resources that
would later help stimulate revitalization.
Government Response to decline
"Twenty years ago, Providence was a case study for the decline of industrial,
Northeastern cities. It was dirty and decrepit, and it grimy image was further soiled by the
notoriety it gained as the headquarters of the mob" (Whitmire 22).
An affiliate of the Providence Chamber of Commerce, the Foundation is a private sector advocate for
downtown economic development.
Despite the downward spiraling economic trend since the 1950s, it was not until the mid-
1970s that the governmental dialogue surrounding urban policy shifted toward downtown
revitalization. The influence of the business community in initiating and framing this
dialogue is significant in that it impacted the goals and outcomes of redevelopment in a
manner that spoke to the interests of ensuing public-private partnerships.
Mayor Doorley, the predecessor of current Mayor Cianci, "had shown neither interest nor
leadership in matters relating to downtown during the preceding decade" (Motte and Weil
10). The administration had failed to pursue the federal aid that might have slowed the
decline of downtown Providence. It is perhaps fortunate though that the city lacked the
will and the capital to pursue the Planning Department's Downtown Providence 1970
plan since it advocated widespread urban renewal. Published in 1960, the redevelopment
plan called for clearance of many older, historically and architecturally significant
buildings to make way for new construction of civic, office and residential complexes
(American Planning Association 2). Nevertheless, the Doorley administration's overall
policy of indifference stood in sharp contrast to the approach of many other northeastern
cities which were "responding to decline in creative ways" (Motte and Weil 10).
The events of 1973, however, highlighted the need for a carefully defined downtown
revitalization plan. The relocation of Rhode Island's largest independent insurance group
to neighboring Johnston, combined with the judicial system's plan to move the state court
complex to the suburbs, as well as the closure of two of Providence's largest department
stores, were indicators of the city's rapid deterioration. "The trend threatened to
evaporate the critical mass necessary to sustain a viable downtown economy, which it
seemed would no longer survive under the tacit city policy of benign neglect" (Motte and
Weil 10).
As significant businesses abandoned Providence, the "business community began to
organize a response to the disintegration of the functional and physical fabric of the CBD
(Motte and Weil 10). A small group of Providence business leaders approached Doorley
in the fall of 1973 with the idea of establishing a public-private partnership with the city.
After discussions between the mayor and the Providence Chamber of Commerce, the
Providence Foundation was created with the goal of creating, planning and facilitating
feasible downtown development projects.
The change in mayoral leadership in 1975 signified a turning point in city policy toward
downtown. Despite his support for the establishment of the Providence Foundation,
Doorley' s administration had demonstrated little enthusiasm for downtown initiatives, or
indeed planning for the city as a whole:
Doorley often seems to look only at the bottom line, checking the cost
figures, and often ignoring what are sometimes termed civic needs or social
benefits...Neighborhoods are deteriorating, yet it seems the Doorley
administration's only response is to tear down more abandoned houses. The
city's port, though profitable, has been decaying through lack of repairs. The
mayor has never demonstrated much interest in urban planning of any kind.
(Bailey G1)
Upon assuming office, Cianci sought to distinguish himself from his predecessor,
charging that the previous administration had "abdicated its responsibility to Downtown
Providence" (Wood qtd. in Motte and Weil 11). With the backing of the Chamber of
Commerce, the Mayor and the Providence Foundation proceeded to redirect attention to
revitalizing the downtown. Over the next few years, they achieved a number of notable
successes. First, the partnership persuaded the governor to keep the state court system in
Providence by building a new downtown court complex. Second, the historic Biltmore
hotel, which had closed and was being considered as possible housing for the elderly, was
renovated for continued use as a hotel (Interview with Baudouin). Third, the old Loews
theatre was saved from demolition and, with the infusion of city dollars, converted into
the Providence Performing Arts Center. Fourth, the Providence Arcade (the oldest
shopping mall in the U.S. dating back to 1828) was refurbished and reopened (Motte and
Weil 12).
While these projects were small both in scope and in their impact on the downtown
economy, they were nevertheless important developments. Not only were these projects
completed without any federal or state money (instead relying on low interest loans and
city bond issues), they demonstrated to potential investors the ability of the Foundation
and Mayor to achieve success, even with unconventional financing (Motte and Weil 12).
The next phase of development though was much more ambitious and would transform
the landscape of downtown.
Downtown Planning
Although the city did not implement Downtown Providence 1970, the plan did influence
the course of downtown redevelopment. It was the first scheme to promote relocating the
railroad tracks, which acted as a barrier to the cohesion of the city by separating the State
House, downtown and the northern part of the city. As visible in Appendix D, Exhibit 3,
the railroad tracks, their sidings, service facilities and buffer zone "carved a quarter mile
swathe through downtown, literally dividing it in half..." (Motte and Weil 11). Not only
did this create a physical obstacle to vehicular or pedestrian circulation since there was no
road or bridge over the tracks, but the tracks "were an impediment to development"
(Interview with Shamoon). By submerging the tracks and relocating the train station, over
60 acres would be opened up for redevelopment.
Downtown Providence 1970 also influenced the course of downtown development in that
its proposed clearance of significant buildings prompted several professors from the
Rhode Island School of Design to craft an alternative, Interface Providence. Published in
1974, this transportation and circulation study advocated intermodal transportation
alternatives as a tool for downtown revitalization (American Planning Association 2).
The plan suggested a ring-road and satellite parking garages to alleviate congestion in the
core, and improving road and pedestrian linkages between the financial district, the
historic retail core, the government district and the surrounding residential neighborhoods
of College Hill and Smith Hill (Motte and Weil 11).
Interface Providence also recommended recapturing the city's waterfront. With three
downtown rivers largely covered by roadways, bridge, freight yards and parking lots, the
plan recommended reclaiming the Woonasquatucket River and establishing a new small
lake, and framing these with a large green space that would be created between the
existing railroad tracks and the State House (American Planning Association 2). This idea
of reclaiming the river and creating new parks resurfaced in later plans and eventually
was implemented, though in a different form to the original proposal.
While Interface Providence plan did not explicitly advance relocating the railroad tracks,
it prompted discussion around the issue of redevelopment in the downtown. This
discussion gained momentum as entrepreneurs in Providence seized an opportunity to
access federal funding and redirect it to meet their redevelopment goals. With a huge
energy crisis looming in the late 1970s, the federal government had responded by making
millions of dollars available to upgrade railroad infrastructure through the North East
Corridor Improvement Project (Interview with Shamoon).
After conducting a feasibility study to assess the potential costs of relocating the railroad
tracks, Ron Marsella, then director of the Providence Foundation, determined that the
federal government's $15 million budget for rehabilitating the tracks might be enough to
cover the costs of submerging the tracks underground. Marsella mobilized private and
public sector leaders to support the objective of a unified downtown based on railroad
relocation, then presented the proposal to the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA).
With the help of Rhode Island Senator Pell (Interview with Shamoon), the FRA agreed to
the proposal subject to a demonstration of physical and fiscal feasibility, and, by the
summer of 1979, the US Department of Transportation conditionally approved the track
relocation (Motte and Weil 14).
It is interesting to note the process by which the city assembled land for redevelopment,
since it had the potential to be a highly contentious and complicated operation. Instead of
having to recommend land condemnation, the Foundation secured a Master Property
Conveyance Contract which "demonstrated that a series of property swaps would ensure
that all land owners with titles to property abutting the new track locations would benefit
from the deal" (Motte and Weil 13). Each landlord maintained ownership rights in order
to earn a profit from redevelopment. The Providence-Worcester Railroad held a
"lionshare of the land" and ensured long-term participation by refusing to sell and opting
for 99 year leases (Interview with Shamoon). Much of the build-out in the area did end
up occurring on this land, and the Providence Worcester Railroad, or Capital Properties
as it became know, benefited from its early decision to retain control.
Capital Center District and Development Initiatives
In 1978, at a Providence Foundation Executive Board meeting, Marsella first made
reference to the Capital Center District as the 60-acre tract of land that would be created
by the railroad relocation. The Capital Center Special Development District was
established by State enabling legislation in 1981 and by city ordinance in 1982 (Capital
Center Commission 1), with a governing board that included the Mayor, the Governor
and the Providence Foundation.
The objectives and projected benefits of the project are outlined in more detail in Chapter
3, but can be summarized as the following:
1) To create new and marketable commercial land without demolishing existing
downtown structures in order to attract major new users who might not otherwise
locate in the Capital City.
2) To enhance vehicular access to the project area, the State House and downtown.
3) To create an ordered sense of public spaces. The District was intentionally created as
a high density urban district where large contiguous structures would define the
diversity of space.
4) To create a visual and physical linkage between downtown and the State House,
emphasizing the radial view to the State House Dome.
(Capital Center Commission 1)
The design and architecture firm, Skidmore, Owens and Merrill, hired by the Capital
Center Commission, completed the original plan in 1979 for the Capital Center District
which was updated periodically to "refine the redevelopment concept and to reflect and
accommodate changes such as the river relocation project" (Capital Center Commission
1).
During the eighties, redevelopment ensued in downtown Providence at an impressive rate
as economic and political resources converged on the area. Following the Capital Center
designation, the railroad tracks were relocated (1985-1987), Amtrak opened a new station
(1987), 60 acres of land were cleared for redevelopment, highway ramps were
constructed to link State Routes 6 and 10 and Interstate 95 directly to downtown (1988), a
street furniture and beautification plan was implemented (1989-1993), and a new road
and bridge linking Capital Center to the historic core at Francis Street were put in place
(1989) (Motte and Weil 16).
The land clearance and infrastructure upgrades paved the way for the next phase of
development in the nineties, which included the tremendously important River
Relocation project. A summary of development is provided in Appendix C. By moving
the confluence of the Woonasquatucket and Moshassuck Rivers from near Exchange
Street to Steeple Street at Memorial Square and uncovering the Providence River
(Appendix D, Exhibit 1) several hundred feet to the east of its original location
(American Planning Association 4), land opened up for Waterplace Park and a downtown
ring-road, Memorial Boulevard (Motte and Weil 16). Additional development included
the construction of the Rhode Island Convention Center and parking garage in 1993, the
Westin Hotel in 1994, a series of vehicular and pedestrian bridges over the Providence
River which linked downtown to bordering neighborhoods on the East side (1993-1996),
Memorial Park in 1996 and the Providence Place Mall in 1998-1999 (Motte and Weil
16).
Corporate Center Approach
While Providence's downtown redevelopment initiative did not initially focus on the
festival marketplace or tourism-oriented approach that other northeastern cities adopted,
it nevertheless was a response of the business sector to the changing economy. "...A
small cadre of private sector businessmen and their staff representatives at the
Foundation" (Motte and Weil 14) initially crafted the vision for a revitalized downtown,
and it was only later that the balance in the public-private partnership shifted toward the
public sector.
The decision to focus on the service sector stemmed from an understanding of the macro-
economy's transformation. The Capital Center project's stated objectives and conclusions
made clear the need for Providence to adapt its economic base in order to compete
regionally:
As a recent report by the Urban Land Research Foundation states, 'In the
face of national decline in manufacturing employment, the key to economic
vitality for most cities will lie in the service sector...those cities which have
established or can establish themselves as major regional service nodes will
be much better than those which have not or cannot.
(Providence Foundation 5)
It is interesting that the Capital Center commission focused on office development as the
means for expanding its tax base, and not a strategy that included retail. Indeed, when the
Capital Center plan was first conceived, office was the exclusive use: "department stores
were prohibited" (Interview with Wender). Apparently, this was a "political not a
planning decision" as the retailers in the old downtown district were concerned about
competition (Interview with Shamoon). Later, the commission amended the plan to allow
for retail and housing.
The dominance of business interests resulted not just from their having initiated the early
discussions, but from the Mayor supporting their efforts. By advocating a downtown
redevelopment strategy over one that focused on the neighborhoods, the Mayor
reinforced the position of business interests. Despite acknowledging when he first came
into office that Providence was "in dire straits" with the "downtown... deserted and the
neighborhoods were in tough shape" (Kelly A10), Mayor Cianci pursued a downtown-
oriented approach.
The absence of neighborhood or opposing interests in the debate was deliberate and
necessary to achieving the city's vision of a redeveloped downtown. By 1977, Cianci had
consolidated almost total control over the community development process by appointing
all the members of the Citizens Advisory Council on community development. "On the
few occasions in which neighborhood activists on the CAC presented any challenge to
Cianci, "he simply appointed more supporters" (Motte and Weil 15). Moreover, the
democratic city council repeatedly challenged the Mayor's use of community
development funds and his emphasis on downtown, but to no avail; Cianci proceeded to
designate "downtown as a separate eligible neighborhood and reserved more than half of
CDBG monies for 'mayor's priorities'... and that came increasingly to focus on
prestigious projects downtown" (Motte and Weil 15). By the early 1980s, the remaining
opposition to the Mayor had been defeated, and "business interests were generally the
only organized presence in the debate over downtown" (Motte and Weil 15).
The Case for Neighborhood Development
As the city focused its planning efforts and resources on the downtown area during the
eighties, the situation in many of the neighborhoods, particularly those with low-income
and ethnically diverse populations, deteriorated. A study conducted by the Providence
Plan, a nonprofit organization that tackles issues surrounding poverty throughout the city
highlighted this decline in its 1994 Neighborhood Factbook.
Three communities, all located close to downtown that underwent particular distress were
Upper South Providence, Elmwood and Olneyville. Heads of community development
corporations in each of these communities were interviewed as part of this
current investigation.
Table 2.1: Providence Citywide and Neighborhood Statistics
1980 1990 1980-1990
Amount ($) % Amount ($) % % Change
Providence $14,948 - $28,342 - 89.6
Upper South Providence $9,928 0.66 $11,604 0.41 16.9
Olneyville $12,730 0.85 $16,857 0.59 32.4
Elmwood $10,734 0.72 $19,552 0.69 82.2
* entries in % column refer to the ratio of neighborhood value to citywide value
1980 1990 1980-1990
Amount % Amount % % Change
Providence 29,941 20.4 34,120 23 14
Upper South Providence 1,338 41.8 1,967 50.7 47
Olneyville 1,800 27.6 2,208 37.4 22.7
Elmwood 3,115 30 3,846 35.1 23.5
1980 1990 1980-1990
Amount % Amount % % Change
Providence 6,632 9.2 7,008 9.2 5.7
Upper South Providence 174 11.5 274 18.5 57.5
Olneyville 439 15.6 272 11.3 -38
Elmwood 473 11.3 649 14.1 37.2
Source: Providence Plan
As the data in Table 2.1 indicates, the three neighborhoods did not fare well in
comparison to the city as a whole during the 1980 to 1990 period. In Upper South
Providence, the median family income in 1989 was the lowest in the city at $11,604,
nearly 60% lower than the citywide median family income. In addition, the
unemployment rate had increased during the period 1980-1990, from 11.5% to 18.5%,
more than twice the citywide rate of 9.2% and the percentage of persons below poverty
increased from 41.8% in 1980 to 50.7% in 1990.
The profile of Olneyville confirmed a similar story of decline. The incidence of poverty
had increased sharply for all demographic groups during the period. At $16,857, the
median family income was 41% percent lower than the citywide figure. Population had
declined and less than half (42%) of all persons aged 25 or older had completed high
school in 1990.
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Elmwood fared marginally better than Upper South Providence and Olneyville, but still
experienced severe distress, particularly in relation to the city as a whole. In 1990,
median family income was reported as $19,522, approximately one third lower than the
city statistic. The percentage of persons below poverty increased from 30% in 1980 to
35.1% in 1990, with a 14.1% unemployment rate in the latter year.
Clearly, these neighborhoods required the mobilization of immense resources if their
conditions were to improve. However, with business interests tilting the balance of
planning in Providence towards downtown development, and with the role of the city
planning department in this process restricted to "acquisition for the redevelopment
agency and to approving vision" (Interview with Deller), opportunities for these
communities were limited.
Thus, while the Capital Center District was an ambitious and complex undertaking that
required an immense planning effort, its failure to include the needs of neighborhoods in
framing the issue or in reviewing the project was problematic. As the city focused on
redeveloping the downtown area, it neglected to conceive of linkages that would
distribute gains from new economic activity to the surrounding communities. Despite
substantial investment in Providence, conditions in many neighborhoods continued to
decline.
CHAPTER 3
FINDINGS AND ANALYSIS
The findings and analysis presented in this section comment on the success of the
revitalization project in achieving a diverse set of objectives. This diversity specifically
recommends that not only should the downtown area be served by redevelopment but that
neighborhoods should also access the economic and physical benefits conferred by the
project.
In assessing the extent of physical change and generation of new economic activity
through revenue collection, increases in private investment and property values, the first
set of outcomes discussed in this chapter refer more to the impact of the project on
downtown. This narrow focus reflects more the objectives of the corporate center
approach toward downtown redevelopment.
The second set of outcomes address the extent to which the benefits of downtown
development have impacted neighborhood development. By assessing economic
spillover, diversity of users and formal hirings and community benefits, it is possible to
comment on the success of the project in achieving a more comprehensive type of
revitalization than the corporate center approach prescribes.
It should be pointed out that while the project is not yet complete, it is nevertheless
possible to assess the initiative in terms of intent, in terms of phased goals set forth in the
original plans and in terms of the substantial infrastructure and public/private
development that has occurred.
CHANGE IN PHYSICAL APPEARANCE OF AREA
Prior to redevelopment, the area that became the Capital Center consisted largely of
elevated railroads and switching yards that were no longer in use and converted into
parking lots (Appendix D, Exhibit 2). The tracks prevented development and reuse of the
land between the State House and downtown, thereby contributing to the lack of aesthetic
cohesion and integration with the historic core, in particular. Whereas the core reflected
an urban quality with its high densities and mix of uses, the Capital Center area with its
sprawling parking lots and prohibitive railroad infrastructure, failed to negotiate the
transition between the core and the monumental quality of the State House (Appendix D,
Exhibit 3)
Moreover, the railroad structure, storage sheds and parking lots obstructed axial views to
the State House from downtown. Views from the northeastern corner of Kennedy Plaza,
Memorial Square, Dorrance and Fulton streets were poor (United States 120). The
desolate nature of the environment was exacerbated by the city's failure to capitalize on
its opportunity to engage with its riverfront. Indeed, the city had "put sections
underground or between concrete banks" (HUD 96).
The experience for the pedestrian in attempting to traverse this terrain was especially
problematic. The 1981 Final Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) of the railroad
relocation project clearly documented the hazardous nature of this encounter:
Pedestrian exchange between the retail center of the downtown and the
governmental and university buildings on the State House hill is nominal. The
distance between the State House and the corner of Westminister and
Dorrance Streets is approximately 1,500 feet. More discouraging to the
pedestrian, however is the change in grade which must be negotiated, the
barrenness of the at-grade parking which separates the two activity centers,
numerous conflicts with automobiles, and the unpleasantness of passing
beneath existing railroad viaducts. The qualitative deficiencies in the
downtown pedestrian environment have been identified by survey as major
inhibitors to people coming into the downtown area for shopping, cultural and
civic activities. These deterrents are related to perceptions of poor
maintenance and lack of personal security. (United States 48-9)
The efforts over the last 20 years to revitalize the Capital Center district have transformed
the physical nature of the environment in a multitude of ways. Following the relocation
of the station and tracks, the streets have been reconfigured significantly to enhance
highway access as well as to improve the pedestrian environment. New highway ramps
were constructed, Exchange Terrace extended, Gaspee and Francis Streets relocated and
Memorial Boulevard introduced as a downtown ring road. Francis Street is particularly
important since it links the district to the historic core and provides direct pedestrian
access to the State House. Moreover, the axial views to the State House have improved
with excellent view corridors along Francis Street (Appendix D, Exhibit 4) and Exchange
Street in particular.
The streetscape improvements have also helped change the environment. The city has
built new sidewalks, added Victorian style street lamps both in the district and the
historic core, and planted trees throughout the district. The lamps are particularly
noteworthy since they give downtown Providence a definite character and aesthetically
link the historic core to the Capital Center. The rehabilitation of the former station and
the addition of a new building in the same red brick style at the intersection of Exchange
Terrace and Exchange Street has also helped maintain the heritage of the area and
enhanced the quality of Exchange Terrace.
The construction that has occurred in the district has clearly transformed the physical
landscape. Major developments include the Center Place apartments, Marriott Courtyard,
Citizens Plaza building, American Express building and of course the Providence Place
mall. By introducing retail and restaurants, the mall attracts users after 5pm and thus
contributes to nighttime activity and a sense of security in the area. The mall also boasts
the skybridge link to the Westin Hotel which adds an interesting aesthetic element to the
environment (Appendix D, Exhibit 5).
The city's efforts to celebrate its rivers have impacted the area tremendously. The River
Relocation project entailed exposing segments of the rivers and diverting their course to
"converge at an aesthetically strategic point around the Capital Center property" (HUD
96). The extent of this transformation can be seen in Appendix D, Exhibit 1, which shows
the former and current location of the rivers. The city lined the rivers with pedestrian
walkways, constructed bridges and restored a river basin area, now known as Waterplace.
Containing a park, amphitheater and restaurants, Waterplace is the location for the
Waterfire, an annual event featuring bonfires on the rivers that draws thousands to the
area.
The physical characteristics that indicated disinvestment and urban blight have largely
been eradicated through redevelopment. The environment is friendlier to pedestrians than
it was previously and vehicular circulation has also benefited from street reconfiguration
and improved highway access. The decision to focus on the waterfront was inventive and
shrewd, and helped Providence gain national media attention: "Urban planners across
America say Providence's $1.5 billion facelift is increasingly seen as a model for urban
revival in the 21st century (Tye B1). The creation of significant public space at
Waterplace Park and at the mall is important in that it attracts a variety of users to the
area and contributes to street animation.
In assessing the extent to which revitalization has transformed the physical environment,
it is important to consider both the magnitude and quality of these improvements. Despite
the clear accomplishment of magnitude, the project has not fully achieved its design and
development potential. The Capital Center Development Plan, prepared by Skidmore,
Owings and Merrill, stated the following:
One of the overriding concerns of the plan is to insure that development
reaches urban densities and that land uses relate to each other in urbane ways.
The notion of urban design demands a strict relationship of street to building
lot. In the plan, commercial buildings are situated on streets, in contrast to
suburban development, where buildings attempt to sit in landscapes. (25-26)
Unfortunately, some of the development that has occurred is low-density and suggestive
of the suburban environment. A local broker characterized the American Express
structure (Appendix D, Exhibit 6) as a "suburban building in an urban setting" (Interview
with Hayes). With 4 floors and a typical floor size of 28,250 sq ft, this low-rise building
contrasts sharply with the Citizens Plaza building, which has 12 floors and a typical floor
size of 17,732 sq ft. It also contrasts with the more dense nature of the central business
district where buildings tend to have smaller floor sizes, 4 or more floors and are infill
rather than stand-alone structures (Appendix D, Exhibit 7). The open concrete
landscaping connecting the American Express building to the station has reinforced this
suburban feel.
Moreover, in terms of urban density and relationships, the Capital Center district lacks a
cohesiveness and concentration of activity that is found in the historic core. Upcoming
projects, however, are likely to address this issue. With the mixed-use development on
Parcels 2 and 9, which includes ground floor retail, the District can expect to develop as a
more urban environment. The introduction of retail, restaurants, a hotel, residential and
office space should contribute to 24-hour activity in the area.
Design is also an issue in the Capital Center district. While the development on Exchange
Terrace and the Providence Place Mall demonstrate high design standards through the use
of quality materials and attention to detail, the older buildings, in particular, lack the
same positive attributes. Despite the oversight of the Capital Center Design Review
Committee, certain developments have compromised the design integrity of the district.
In addition to the American Express structure, the plain and imposing faqade of the
adjacent Center Place apartment building contributes to a dull setting. Although "the jury
is still out" in terms of design (Interview with Shamoon), it seems that as the District
becomes more attractive to developers, the Design Review Commission will be able to
exercise more control over design elements.
Finally, it is important to analyze in more depth the pedestrian environment. While the
removal of obstructing infrastructure and the addition and upgrading of streets mark an
improvement over the existing condition, circulation between the central business district
and Capital Center remains an issue. The fast flowing nature of the six-lane Memorial
Boulevard makes for a somewhat hazardous trip, particularly at the intersections with
Exchange Street and Francis Street. Given the location of the mall at Francis Street,
safety at this interchange is particularly important as families attempt to cross within a
limited timeframe. Although the Skybridge is meant to carry foot traffic over the side of
the intersection that is closest to the highway ramp, not everyone uses this and often
pedestrians are caught in the middle of the road. It seems that the mall as a whole was
built more for the suburban or automobile dependent user than it was for the pedestrian or
urban visitor. Although the mall has several entrances for foot traffic, they lack
prominence and to an extent accessibility.
GENERATOR OF NEW ECONOMIC ACTIVITY
Private Investment
"Relocation of the railroad tracks and the appropriate development of the Capital Center
District will leverage the public investment to create opportunities for substantial private
investment" (Providence Foundation 6).
By investing public funds into land clearance, assemblage and infrastructure
improvements, the Capital Center Commission hoped to create new and marketable
commercial parcels that would attract major new users to the area. The ability to leverage
significant private investment was thus an early objective, though the Commission did
not detail specific goals regarding the extent of leverage.
Table 3.1: Private Investment in the Capital Center District (1985-2000)
Development Amount
Former Union Station Renovation/Expansion $30,000,000
Citizens Plaza Building $38,000,000
Center Place Apartments $47,000,000
Boston Financial $18,000,000
Providence Place Mall $450,000,000
Marriott Courtyard Hotel $20,000,000
Total $603,000,000
Source: Capital Center Commission
To date, private investment in the Capital Center totals approximately $603,000,000. The
recent Providence Place Mall accounts for the largest investment in the area, perhaps
signaling increasing investor confidence in the Capital Center district. Indeed, the mall
has been credited with generating additional investment in the area: "the success of
Providence Place and the likelihood it will continue to spur economic development
projects, such as more hotels and retail center in is shadows is a terrific story"
("Downtown" 1).
The goal, according to the Providence Foundation, is to generate over $1billion in private
investment over a 20-year build out (Interview with Baudouin). Three major projects are
nearing approval for Parcels 2, 4E and 4W and 9. With no new office or residential
construction on the site since the early 1990s, these projects represent a crucial new phase
of development in the Capital Center district. With Parcel 2's $150 million mixed-use
development set to break ground in the fall of 2001, and with additional projects to
follow (Appendix C), the Capital Center district is on its way to achieving its goal.
While the level of private investment is impressive, in order to gauge its significance, it is
important to place this figure within the context of investment as a whole in the district,
as well as to examine private investment and development in surrounding areas.
Although comparable data is not available on a per project basis in the Capital Center
District, information pertaining to public investment over a period of time makes such a
comparison possible. There are various estimates available for portions of the project,
including one that estimated $42 million in federal highway funds for track relocation,
and the new station and underground garage construction (Kelly A10).
Perhaps the most useful figure for the purpose of understanding public versus private
investment is that, "between 1986 and 1998, the city spent $1.75 billion, approximately
90% of which was from federal sources on public infrastructure improvements, including
a convention center, a hotel, rail and road upgrades, the relocation of two rivers to create
a park and urban design and landscaping projects (Motte and Weil 10). By deducting the
cost of the convention center (it does not officially fall within the Capital Center district)
and by adding the mall tax breaks, the total public investment for this period is
approximately $1.68 billion, giving a public private investment ratio of 1: 0.38. With
over $1bn of private investment needed at this point to bring it to the level of public
investment, the lack of leverage seems problematic.
Two qualifications however, should be made regarding this leverage estimate. First, it is
unclear how much public investment was designed to directly stimulate private
investment. Second, given that the public sector needed to commit funds for
infrastructure upfront, whereas private investment is projected over a longer timeframe
with additional large projects anticipated, the ratio could improve. Nevertheless, the
massive total cost of the project should not be overlooked.
Increase in Property Values
In addition to examining increases in private investment, it is important to assess whether
revitalization has positively impacted property values. Given the extent of development
devoted to office space in the Capital Center and central business district (CBD) area, and
given the lack of property sales in the Capital Center, this study assumed that a
comparison of office rents would yield the most valuable data.
Table 3.2 : Class A office space rent/ sq
Capital Center
2000
$28.75
17.35%
$23.16
11.79%
1993
$25.20
2.88%
$21.51
3.80%
Year 1988
Rent*/Sq Ft $24.50
% Increase over 1988
Central Business District
Rent*/ Sq ft $20.75
% Increase over 1988
1998
$26.74
9.12%
$22.27
7.50%
* weighted average Source: Hayes and Sherry
As Table 3.2 shows, Class A rents in the Capital Center have consistently been higher
and increased at a faster rate than those in the CBD district since the revitalization project
began. The Capital Center's weighted average rent for 2000 amounts to a 17.35%
increase over the 1988 value, compared to the CBD increase of 11.79% over the same
period. In fact, the actual increase could be higher if the artificially high rents for the
Capital Center in 1988 are taken into account. As the table in Appendix E shows,
properties on Exchange Terrace did not lease up until 1993 when the asking rents had
decreased. If rents in 1988 were adjusted to reflect market demand and willingness to
pay, the percentage increases in the Capital Center for the 1988-2000 period would be
greater.
The current Capital Center real estate market is "excellent" according to Ron Marsella,
with rental rates the "highest in the state" (Interview with Marsella). The Citizens Plaza
building is the most expensive office real estate in Providence with an average rent of
$32/sq ft. While rents in downtown Providence do not yet compare to Boston's average
rent of $50.00 - $85.00/ sq ft (Office Market Survey 2000 2), the increases signify a
healthy and growing market.
Although local brokers and real estate developers commented on the success of the
Capital Center in becoming the highest office rental district, those interviewed hesitated
in attributing these rents to project success. Rather than revitalization resulting in higher
rents, general economic forces have impacted the real estate market in this area. As the
ft 1988-2000
economy has driven companies to expand and relocate, the Capital Center has been there
to "receive" this market (Interview with Marsella). And, the lack of recent construction in
the downtown area has "created a shortness of supply" which in light of increasing
demand has caused rents to rise (Interview with Hayes). Moreover, Providence as a
whole has become more "livable" and this has increased the willingness of companies to
locate in the Capital Center district (Interview with Hayes).
While determining causality is a complicated and problematic task, it is nevertheless
difficult to imagine that the improvements in the Capital District have not in some way
contributed to rising rents in the District. The revitalization project has successfully
transformed the area into a sought-after location. According to a local broker: "The
Capital Center District has become a particularly desirable area because of proximity to
Providence Place and other anticipated developments..." (Richard Alden qtd. in Healy
and Costello 5). The fact that the Providence Place mall and additional developments are
all located within the Capital Center district attest to some level of the project success.
Indeed, according to the Hayes and Sherry's Providence Office Market Survey 2000, the
new development rates are projected in the "upper $30's" (2). If it is assumed that rents
in the central business district act as a proxy for what might have occurred in the absence
of improvement, then there is a clear indication that the Capital Center with its greater
rent increases is a more attractive option for location. While the district has certainly
benefited from an improved economy that has created demand for Class A office space in
particular, revitalization in the Capital Center seems to have positively impacted rents.
There is also the issue of whether the Capital Center development has helped to build
demand in the downtown area as a whole. With Class A vacancy down from 9.46% in
1999 to an all time low of 3.97% in 2000 (Office Market Survey 2000 2), and downtown
Providence measuring a positive absorption of 129,073 sq ft during 2000 (Healy and
Costello 5), the market is certainly healthy. If it is assumed that the mall and anticipated
development has boosted the image of Providence and increased its desirability as a
location, then it would appear that the Capital Center project has contributed to at least
maintaining, if not improving, the office market.
Revenue Generation
The original benchmarks that planners and other city officials set for revenue generation
were clear and optimistic. In 1980, the Providence Sunday Journal Magazine reported the
following:
The advantages in tax revenue and new jobs would be enormous. By the mid-
1990s, the city would be collecting up to $5 million annually in additional
property taxes, and the yield might rise to $10 million annually when all
construction is completed, according to one analysis. (Collins 10)
Similarly, the 1981 EIS projected that by the year 2000, annual tax revenues would be
$6. Im to $6.8m higher than the other alternatives discussed, which included a no-build
scenario (United States 133). This increase was based on the assumption that rail
relocation would have a positive impact on land values due to the proposed public
investments in the new station, parking, streets, utilities and other improvements in the
area, as well as the new development that would occur (United States 133).
The impact of the project on retail sales and sales tax revenue was considerably less than
the figures projected for increased property tax revenue. In acknowledging the decline of
retail sales in the downtown area, the EIS clarified that development planned for the
Capital Center District would include "only minor retail activities in support of the
offices and their tenants" and would "not compete with downtown retailers" (United
States 132). Instead, the "expanded population of downtown workers would...provide a
much larger market for stores, restaurants and other downtown institutions" (Collins 10).
By estimating $400 to $500 annual downtown retail sales per employee, the EIS
predicted that the 4800 new employees in the project area would increase downtown
retail sales by approximately $1.9m to $2.4 million annually (United States 132).
While increases in property tax revenue have been realized, the gains fall short of the
projected figures. In 2000, the city collected $3.9min property taxes from the Capital
Center area compared to $0.8m in 1988, an increase of $3.1m 2. Although this is $1.9m
less than the lower estimate of $5m, it could be argued that the project is behind schedule
and that the yield could conceivably rise to $10m or more once all the construction is
complete.
The discussion however surrounding increased property tax revenue resulting from the
revitalization project is more complex than the above data suggests. Not only have tax
assessment practices resulted in the city's failure to capture significant increases in land
and building values, but the structure of certain tax stabilization agreements have
severely impacted the city's ability to benefit from potential tax revenue.
While a comprehensive property reevaluation is currently underway, the City of
Providence's last full reevaluation was in December of 1987. During the intervening
period, assessment increases have been linked to an index. The problem that this practice
has presented for the Capital Center is that values are based on the last assessment, rather
than appraised according to market value (Interview with Marino). Although this practice
might result in underappraisal for the entire city- indeed it seems that the most recent
appraisal might have increased property values throughout Providence by three or four
times (Interview with Hayes) - the issue is more critical in the Capital Center area, which
has seen major improvements as well as new development.
2 Author's own calculations based on data collected from the City of Providence Tax Assessors Office.
Table 3.3: Proposed Reevaluation for Selected Capital Center Properties (2001)
Assessed
Value
Increase 2000-
2001
Rent
Increase
1998-2000
I I I I I I
Avalon Froperties
Capital Properties Inc
Capital Properties Inc
Capital Properties Inc
Capital Properties Inc
Capital Properties Inc
Capital Properties Inc
3U Center Flace
1 American Express
6 Moshashuck
5 Moshashuck
65 Park Row (LBO1)
65 Park Row (LL01)
1 Moshashuck
As table 3.3 indicates, the 2001 reevaluation proposed substantial increases over the 2000
assessment. It is possible to gauge the extent of these increases by comparing the data for
the highlighted Class A office properties with rent increases in these properties. Given
that the 2000 assessment is based on the certified tax base established as of December 31,
1998, comparing these assessment figures to the 1998-2000 rent period is valid. The
disparity between the proposed reevaluation increases and the actual rent increases is
marked and suggests substantial forfeiture of tax revenue. Whereas the rent increase for
30 Exchange Terrace is 17.65%, the reevaluation seeks to raise the total assessed value
by 110%. This large increase represents change over a 10-year period that, due to a lack
of frequent evaluations, is essentially being realized in one year. The subsequent loss of
intervening tax revenue is substantial and impacts the city's capacity to provide public
services.
Lot# Owner Address Total
Assessed
2001
10U)
108
113
114
115
115
118
$24,4b0,4UU
$14,821,100
$2,153,990
$3,166,080
$3,102,200
$6,856,200
$4,194,780
31. 64%u
52.04%
19.49%
19.44%
0.20%
260.00%
19.44%
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Although the frequency of property reevaluation is established by the state, it is in the
city's interest to work with the state on establishing a better system. Prior to new
legislation in 1997, Rhode Island had a ten-year reevaluation cycle. Under the new law,
the state requires communities to conduct an assessment every nine years, along with
statistical updates in the third and sixth year (RIPEC 1). However, this legislation may
not go far enough since communities can delay reevaluations or updates. The Rhode
Island Public Expenditure Council recommends that "the General Assembly consider a
process by which the State would conduct (through contracted services) either the
reevaluation or statistical update should a municipality intend to delay its reevaluation or
update" (RIPEC 7). Given the costs to the municipality of conducting reevaluations,
many communities have delayed the process and thereby reduced their ability to capture
the revenue from increasing property values.
The issue of tax exemptions and stabilizations is important in that it also represents lost
revenue for the city and the state. Although private investment in the Providence Place
mall amounts to approximately $450 million, it has benefited from substantial public
subsidies, particularly in the form of tax breaks (Motte and Weil 16). The tax stabilization
agreement with the municipality approved $136 million in property tax relief over 30
years (West and Orr 4). The magnitude of this tax break becomes more apparent when
comparing the mall's annual abatement of $4.53 million a year to the city's total tax
revenue from the Capital Center of $3.9 million and the marginal increase in tax revenue
of $3.1 million. The city has essentially ceded more in tax breaks than it has been able to
generate in increased tax revenues. While the direct public investment in the project was
largely from state and federal highway funds, by offering somewhat excessive indirect
subsidies, the city has foregone substantial revenue from development in area that will no
doubt appreciate over the next 30 years.
The state's subsidies of the mall project are also noteworthy. Not only did developers
build the mall on donated state-owned land, but the state also agreed to grant the
developer $72 million in sales tax relief over 20 years (West and Orr 4). In addition, the
state exempted the developers from paying an estimated $7 million in sales taxes on
construction materials (Motte and Weil 16). While the mall is performing well with sales
at $400/sq ft, occupancy at 92%, and is on target to meet sales tax revenue goals
(Interview with Koechel), the forfeited city and state tax revenue is considerable.
The extent to which the city is not maximizing tax revenue is also evident by comparing
the total private investment in the Capital Center District ($603 million) to the total
assessed value of all properties in the District ($346 million) per the 2000 assessment.
With private investment exceeding assessed value by a factor of 1.7, the city is clearly
not capturing the full value of property in the area and thus is not able to benefit from
increased tax revenue. This is not merely an issue of infrequent evaluations but also
reflects the magnitude of tax incentives that were provided to attract development. While
the mall accounts for $460 million of private investment, it is only valued at $76 million
per the 2000 assessment.
For the city officials interviewed in this study, the Capital Center's generation of tax
revenue indicates its success. However, there has been no attempt to modify revenue
goals in light of the revised development. Moreover, there seems little discussion or
analysis at the government level of the forfeited revenue resulting from underappraisal
and tax breaks. While it is clear that the city and state needed to offer incentives to
private developers in order to revitalize downtown, it is unclear if the extent of subsidies
in the form of tax exemptions were excessive.
Economic Spillover
The issue of spillovers and generating new economic activity in the neighborhoods is
important because it addresses both private and public approaches to resource allocation
and development. While the notion of spillover seems somewhat unintended, city
agencies can determine to a large extent whether new economic activity will be
channeled to other neighborhoods, particularly those that are distressed, or whether
redeveloped downtowns will be "merely 'islands of renewal in seas of decay"' (Berry
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qtd. in "Downtown Redevelopment" 105). Although many of the findings presented in
this section are impressionistic, the preponderance of opinion suggests that not only has
downtown development failed to spur economic development throughout the city, as
suggested by the corporate center approach, but that it has also focused resources on the
downtown to the detriment of neighborhood development.
In addition to spurring development within the district itself, the Capital Center project
has stimulated interest in the area west of the 1-95, and in particular in the Foundry area.
The former Brown and Sharpe mills were at one point the largest such operation in the
states, with 16,500 employees during the 1940s working in 1,000,000 square feet of
industrial space. With the post World War II decline of manufacturing, the foundry was
sold in 1968 and its new owner embarked upon on rehabilitation in the late eighties and
the nineties of 550,000 square feet of office space. According to a local real estate broker,
the Capital Center has not only increased the value of the Foundry and increased rents in
the renovated portion of the office complex, but it has also generated interest in the
remaining two buildings that are not yet renovated (Interview with Hayes). It is possible
that developers will renovate the 180,000 square foot building for residential use, and the
300,000 square foot building for office use (Interview with Hayes).
Some neighborhoods have also benefited from the ripple effects of development in the
Capital Center project. According to the Director of the Providence Foundation, the
increased number of visitors attracted to the District's amenities and events such as
Waterfire have helped develop Federal Hill as a restaurant community, drawn people to
Wickendon Street on the Eastside and increased knowledge of Fox Point (Interview with
Baudouin). Moreover, Broad Street, which links downtown to South Providence, has
benefited from the revitalization with very few vacancies or open parcels, and a majority
of Latino-owned businesses (80%) (Interview with Karlin). By improving conditions
along Broad Street, the downtown development has helped create a "gateway" to South
Providence (Interview with Wills).
_ 
____~
However, in Downcity, the city's historic core, there has been little development
stimulated by the adjacent Capital Center project. The vacant storefronts and
deteriorating structures in parts of Downcity testify to this area's disinvestment and
neglect (Appendix D, Exhibit 8). While Capital Center may have prompted thinking
about Downcity (Interview with Deller), there "has not been the direct beneficial
relationship" that would have resulted in creating "momentum" for development
(Interview with Marsella). Recent initiatives, however, seek to change this situation with
the Rhode Island Foundation investing $10 million in the area, and the convergence of
city and state resources in the hope that Downcity will flourish as an art and
entertainment district. However, as the Providence Business News pointed out, compared
to the Capital Center's cost of "well over a billion dollars," this investment is "hardly
enough" since "there are too many vacant storefronts, too many merchants suggesting
that crime is indeed a problem, too many absentee landlords" ("Downtown" 1).
Moreover, the focus of resources on downtown has negatively impacted neighborhood
development, particularly in low-income communities. In West Elmwood, the local CDC
has been trying to put together an economic development plan. However, policymakers at
the state and city level responded that the CDC should "come back in five years,"
because, according to the CDC director, "everyone is paying attention to downtown and
the suburbs" (Interview with Wells). The director of Olneyville Housing Development
Corporation shares this view, "the neighborhood feels neglected...the resources of
government and planning agencies are aimed at downtown." The economic development
that is occurring in South Providence has largely resulted from community-based efforts
and has not been tied to the downtown project. In bringing new commercial development
to the area such as fish market and grocery store, South Providence "had to import wealth
and revitalize itself' without the assistance of the city or spillover effects from the mall
(Interview with Wills).
The disparity between economic development and commercial activity in the Capital
Center versus Downcity and the neighborhoods relates not just to current policy practices
but also to the original plan. In its conception, the Capital Center proposal did not address
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spillover of economic activity into adjacent neighborhoods or how this spillover might be
directed towards alleviating distress in low-income communities.
In discussing the proposal's impact on adjacent neighborhoods, the EIS highlighted that
demand for housing would increase in proportion to job opportunities, and that this would
lead to "positive economic improvements within those neighborhoods" (135). The report
also stated that negative social impacts of the economic displacement of low- or fixed-
income households would occur during the 1990s as a result of development, but that
with the population losses projected for the city over the next 20 years, "relocation of
these households should not be a problem, and this potential induced impact is not
considered significant" (135). The report did not state, however, how economic activity
in the project area could link to surrounding neighborhoods. While the EIS analyzed
revenue, employment, assessed value and other economic indicators for the project area,
it "never took into account activity outside of the Capital Center district" (Interview with
Marsella). According to the city's former deputy planning director, the Capital Center
project was "development in isolation" and did not concentrate on low-income
communities (Interview with Deller).
This failure to consider neighboring low-income communities at the planning and
implementation stage of the project has been perpetuated by subsequent disinvestment.
For many of the representatives interviewed from community development corporations
and from the city, the fear that resources would be focused on downtown and
neighborhoods neglected has proved to be the case (Interviews with Wills, Shea and
Wells). Indeed, with so much attention on downtown, "people have forgotten to look at
the neighborhoods" (Interview with Deller).
This neglect continues as initiatives continue to direct resources downtown: "the city has
serious problems with disinvestment in poorer neighborhoods" but the "proposed projects
send dollars downtown" (Interview with Shamoon). Without a serious attempt to link
development in downtown to development in the neighborhoods, or to redirect attention
to low income communities in particular, the disparity is set to widen.
Formal Hiring and Community Benefits
The City of Providence has no formal hiring or benefit requirements in funding and/or
permitting agreements with developers. For the Capital Center district, this policy has
resulted in limited formal hiring of minority and female workers, limited provision of on-
site public benefits and no direct apportioning of community benefits to surrounding
neighborhoods. Where specific projects in the Capital Center have required minority and
female worker utilization, it has been due to the application of the State Minority
Business Enterprise statute, or to the negotiation of special agreements between the City
and developers.
In 1986, the State passed the Minority Business Enterprise law (RI Gen Laws 37-14.1-1)
that required 10% participation by disadvantaged businesses in all state construction and
procurement contracts. An MBE is legally defined as a small business at least 51% of
which is owned and operated in daily management by African-Americans, Hispanics,
Portuguese, Asians, Indians or women (Silver 1). An immediate goal of the law was to
"involve minority business enterprises fully in contracts and programs funded by the
state" and it included a 5% bidding allowance to assist qualified MBEs to compete on
offers. This goal reflected the legislature's opinion that state business had previously
excluded these firms and that their underrepresentation in various industries was partly
due to past discrimination (Silver 10).
The state's funding support for the Providence Place Mall project triggered the MBE
statute for minority and women contractor utilization in the infrastructure phase of the
mall's construction. Although there was a "widespread effort to ensure goals for minority
participation were met... .unfortunately the goals were missed by a large margin"
(Interview with Barges). The 3% minority participation in the project fell far short of the
required 10%. One explanation for this discrepancy is that many of the small minority
contractors did not have the equity or capacity to compete for such a large project
(Interview with Barges). Thus, while the Minority Investment Development Corporation
(MIDC) organized job readiness workshops that covered business practices such as the
financial statements that would be required if a contractor was selected, many of the
entrepreneurs lacked the resources to meet these requirements (Interview with Barges).
In terms of the shell construction of the mall, the developers were under no obligation to
fulfill MBE or labor force requirements because private sources of funding dominated
this phase (Interview with Newton). However, Rhode Island's Economic Development
Corporation's Minority Business Enterprise program in collaboration with the Black
Contractor Association secured a contractor and labor force agreement that was tied to
the city's generous tax concession. The agreement set forth a 10% MBE goal and a 20%
minority and women workforce participation goal (Interview with Newton). The attempt
to diversify hirings achieved some degree of success: minority workers comprised 12%
of the workforce, but women made up only 2% (West and Orr 4).
In terms of tenant hiring, there was no guarantee for placing city residents, although the
Providence Place Training Initiative set out appropriate goals. Initiated by the South
Providence Development Corporation (SPDC), the program was an ambitious attempt to
connect residents of low-income communities to employment opportunities at the mall:
SPDC initially advocated for increased participation for the benefit of minority
contractors in the building trades with limited success. Building upon past
advocacy efforts, we organized a coalition of businesses, state and federal
agencies and community groups for delivering a unified model job training
initiative benefiting both the disenfranchised residents of the capital city and
Providence Place merchants. (Wills 3)
After talking with potential employers, SPDC secured three training partners who would
help deliver a quality workforce. Although initially the program was open only to all
Providence residents, with special emphasis placed on recruiting Enterprise Community
residents, it eventually recruited statewide because it included federal funding. The
program's goal was to train and place 215 people: 45 in food service/hospitality; 150 in
retail/customer service and 20 in building maintenance. As of July 2000, when the
Providence Plan conducted a final program assessment, the placement goals had not been
met. Out of 254 applicants, 87 enrolled in one of the training classes. Of the 87 enrolled
participants, 64 completed training (74% completion rate). Of the 64 who completed
training, 47 were placed (73% completion rate) (Program Assessment 1). Of those
placed, 32 secured jobs at or above the living wage of $7.75/hour (HRIC 7).
The Providence Place Training Initiative faced a number of challenges, which impacted
its ability to meet placement goals. With 22 partners and 3 main streams, issues relating
to coordination and the different requirements of the funders proved difficult to tackle.
There was also a disparity between the skill set of the applicant pool and the required
skill set, with the applicants facing more barriers to employment than anticipated. The
program also faced capacity issues in that it was understaffed, lacked funding for the
development and maintenance of required computer systems and could not offer support
services after placement (Program Assessment 5).
In terms of other large projects in the Capital Center, formal minority and female hirings
have been minimal. While the Marriott Courtyard project, which was approved by the
city entailed MBE and laborforce requirements, the Citizens Plaza and Center Place
projects contained no minority contracting or labor language (Interview with Newton).
The case of the Citizens Plaza building is interesting because it highlighted an ambiguity
in the law as to whether or not it covered quasi state agencies. However, per the
subsequent interpretation by the state's legal department, the law does not specifically
cover quasi state agencies (Interview with Newton). Since the land for the Citizen's Place
building was transferred to a quasi state agency, and since the development company was
funding the construction, there was subsequently no MBE or labor force requirement.
According to the Director of the MBE program, cases which involve land transfers from
state ownership should include MBE language since "in general minority citizens and
businesses have not been involved in the overall development in any way that's
beneficial" (Interview with Newton).
Community benefits resulting from the Capital Center project have been on-site and
limited in scope. The Providence Place mall project has provided a number of benefits
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according to its manager, which have included a RIPTA bus layby, 500 high occupancy
vehicle spaces, a city information booth, and an Academy for 11-12 th graders that is due
to start in the Fall of 2001. It is unclear however the extent to which the developer versus
the public sector subsidized each benefit since this information is confidential (Interview
with Koechel). Moreover, it is important to bear in mind that amenities such as the
skybridge, which links the Westin to the mall, was built by the state using $1.25 million
of taxpayer's money (Lockwood 1).
Overall, the extent of formal minority and women hiring and provision of community
benefits has been limited. The city could have set more stringent hiring goals for projects
that utilized city funding or subsidies. However, in contrast to hiring goals, the provision
of community benefits exerts a greater financial impact and so it is perhaps unfair to
evaluate the revitalization effort on the basis of this measurement tool. Unlike the strong
business and real estate climate in Boston which has enabled the city to implement a
fairly stringent linkage program, the climate in Providence has not afforded the city the
same clout: '"The city has not been able to demand impact fees etc in the same way
Boston can, it hasn't gone over that threshold and the city can't afford to lose that type of
investment" (Interview with Deller). The director of the Rhode Island Local Initiatives
Support Corporation shared this view: "I always thought we could get a linkage program
but there has not been enough activity" (Interview with Karlin).
While this argument may hold true for the period during which projects such as the
Citizens Plaza building, Center Place Apartments and even the Providence Place mall
were planned and negotiated, it is unclear if this same argument can be applied today.
With major projects underway in the Capital Center, and with the city and the state about
to revitalize Downcity, perhaps a more intensive and structured discussion surrounding
the provision of community benefits could begin. For low-income neighborhoods located
away from this concentration of resources and investment, the benefits discussion
assumes greater importance: "at this point, the city should be attractive enough that
developers are lining up; demands should include jobs and affordable housing"
(Interview with Shea).
In terms of formal hirings and contractings, there appears to be capacity issues as well as
access issues. While the state's MBE's statute provides a necessary benchmark for
minority and women-owned business participation, there is clearly a gap in developing
the capacity of these enterprises, particularly in the construction industry. The bidding
structure for contracts compounds this effect by "not lending itself to include
opportunities of access for minority contractors" (Interview with Wills). Apparently, this
problem exists statewide. A recent study of the Rhode Island State Government
Contracting with Minority- and Women-Owned Businesses concluded:
In virtually no industry does state utilization of minority and women-
owned business enterprises approach the availability of these firms in the
local market. The disparity between MBE utilization and availability is
greater than that predicted by chance and thus, probably reflects residual
or even present discrimination. (Silver 1)
In the absence of MBE requirements, the bidding process for minority contractors is
perhaps more prohibitive. In reference to the Providence Place Mall's supplier
opportunities, the MIDC commented that it "has businesses able to deliver - linens could
be done by people in the community - but they're never given the chance...it comes
down to a political bidding process" (Interview with Barges). Although the SPDC is
involved in a cardboard recycling initiative in which it shares in revenue (Interview with
Koechel), there are numerous linkages that could be forged between local suppliers and
mall employers and management.
While the city or state does not track mall employment, particularly in terms of employee
place of residence, ethnicity or other socio-economic category, interviews with several
local planning and community development officials revealed important anecdotal
evidence. There is an impression that not only are a lot of the hirings at the mall not
Providence residents (Interviews with Shamoon and Harrington), but that "a lot of the
minority numbers are reached with people outside of the State" (Interview with Karlin).
This presents an interesting issue given the state and federal participation in the project,
and brings into question to what extent should the mall be considered an engine of state
or regional economic development rather than the city's. Without hiring data, it is
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difficult to assess the employment impact. However, it is clear that while the state
benefits from the mall in that it receives all sales tax revenue, the city may not benefit to
the same extent since it does not currently receive any property tax. Given the levels of
poverty and unemployment in Providence neighborhoods, it does seem that the economic
benefits conferred by hirings and contractings should have been more formally targeted
to Providence residents, particularly low-income individuals.
DIVERSITY OF USERS
The Capital Center project has certainly attracted new users to an area that was
previously blighted, but the question remains as to the diversity of this group, particularly
in terms of including neighborhood residents. Interviews with CDCs yielded a largely
negative response to this issue, with the mall drawing specific criticism for its focus on
attracting middle to upper income users.
From its inception, the mall was designed to target a certain socio-economic group,
"Developers publicly touted the mall as an upscale project that would offer retail and
entertainment options not available elsewhere within the state and that the mall would
attract a more upscale clientele of shoppers" (West and Orr 6). By securing Nordstroms,
Filenes and a host of other upscale tenants, the mall positioned itself as a destination
center, hoping to lure suburban shoppers back to the city.
This perception of the mall as a somewhat exclusive amenity was reiterated in interviews
with CDCs situated in low-income neighborhoods: "People without disposable income
can't shop there" (Interview with Wills). Directors at CDCs in both South Providence and
Olneyville commented that their constituents do not shop at the mall (Interviews with
Wills and Shea). Moreover, according to the director of the Minority Investment
Development Corporation, the mall has not attracted lower-middle class groups either:
"in general, the lower middle class does not come into the city unless for work; it used to
be that the lower middle class shopped here" (Interview with Barges). The restaurants in
this area have also targeted an upscale clientele in that they "bring in middle and upper
middle class for events and dining" (Interview with Barges).
The issue of the mall is interesting because a recent study of the demographics of
frequent mall visitors suggests that shoppers are more diverse than expected. Based on
telephone interviews conducted May 6 through May 9 of 2000, with a random sample of
329 Providence adults, West and Orr found that frequent mall visitors tend to be more
minority than the population as a whole3 . According to 1990 Census figures, Providence
is 70 percent white and 30 percent non-white. Among frequent mall visitors, 55 percent
are white, 42 percent non-white and 3 percent did not answer. In terms of income level,
the findings suggest that "the vision of the upscale shoppers has not been fully realized"
(West and Orr 8). With a majority (59%) having family incomes of $50,000 or less and
only 30% of frequent shoppers reporting family incomes of more than $50,000, the mall
seems to be attracting less upper income users than anticipated. Finally, the study found
that the mall is attracting a younger clientele than the population as a whole. While 36%
of the city is between 18 and 34, 57% of mall visitors fall within this age range. And,
while 21% percent of the Providence's population is 55 years or older, only 11 percent of
frequent mall visitors are over 55 (West and Orr 7).
Based on the findings of West and Orr's study, there appears to be a divergence between
the perception and reality of the types of people the mall is attracting. This could be
partially explained by the mall's mix of stores. While the mall remains an upscale
destination, it nevertheless comprises a number of affordable stores as well as a popular
food court and entertainment complex that includes a 16 screen cinema and an IMAX
theatre. Given the lack of entertainment in downtown as a whole, the mall serves as the
primary draw for consumers of entertainment in the area. In addition, West and Orr's
study did not examine the frequency or magnitude of purchases per person. Without this
data, it is impossible to determine the extent to which users are actually making
purchases at the mall versus using it as a destination facility. Indeed, it could be the case
3 Frequent mall visitors were those who had visited the mall at least once a month over the past six months
and accounted for 41% of the sample.
that residents from nearby low-income neighborhoods use the amenities of the food hall
and entertainment complex without making expensive or frequent purchases. Clearly,
more research is needed in this respect.
In terms of other amenities within the Capital Center, such as Waterplace Park, the lack
of research on user demographics combined with the winter timing of this study makes
the issue of user diversity difficult to assess. While the SPDC commented that
neighborhood residents "do make use of affordable amenities such as Waterplace Park
and the Providence Performing Arts" (Interview with Wills), the executive director of
Olneyville Housing Corporation felt that residents in his community did not use
amenities and that events such as Waterfire had a more suburban or regional draw
(Interview with Shea). Moreover, when asked if neighborhood residents used the
downtown cultural and recreational amenities, the director of West Elmwood CDC
responded only that they made use of the bus system (Interview with Wells). Again, more
research is needed to determine the extent to which amenities in the Capital Center attract
a diverse set of users.
It is however important to comment on the nature of upcoming development within the
context of diversity. First, there seem to be no significant public amenities planned for the
District, with the emphasis on commercial and some residential development. Second, the
proposals seek to reinforce the upscale character of the district. For example, the mixed-
use project on Parcel 2 targets middle to upper income groups with no attempt to
introduce mixed-income tenants in the residential portion of the development. If future
development in the district does not aim to attract middle to lower income users of
residential, employment or recreational opportunities, and if no attempt is made to link
new economic activity to the neighborhoods, it is unclear how new projects will benefit a
broader population.
ACCOMPLISHMENT OF CITY OFFICIALS OBJECTIVES
In trying to establish whether the Capital Center project accomplished what it intended to
do at the time of project initiation, this study includes a review of early planning
documents which identify objectives, as well as interviews with city officials. Both
approaches are important; interviews with city officials might yield responses that
comment on changes in objectives, but their understanding of the original goals might be
flawed or biased towards rendering the project outcomes as successful. Conversely, early
planning documents provide benchmarks by which the project success can be measured
but will not include how the project or objectives have been modified over time.
The main sources for early planning objectives are the Capital Center Project: Objectives
and Conclusions, the Final Environmental Impact Statement and the extensive article by
William Collins in the Providence Sunday Journal Magazine covering the plan. Many of
the goals as expressed in these articles have been discussed in the preceding sections and
are summarized in Table 3.4.
In many ways, the original objectives of the plan have been or will be achieved once full
build-out is attained. The Capital Center District is generating additional tax revenue, has
attracted private investment and boasts the highest office rents in Rhode Island.
Moreover, the site had undergone a tremendous physical transformation that has
improved vehicular and pedestrian circulation and created a unique visual identity for the
area that has garnered it the name Renaissance city.
For various officials interviewed, the project has implemented the early vision. In
attempting to create a parcel for private redevelopment, provide good public
infrastructure, transportation and public amenities, the project has "been very successful"
(Interview with Baudouin). The project has also developed properties and land "for
meaningful development to provide jobs" (Interview with Shamoon) and has generated
"tax dollars that the city never got before" (Interview with Deller).
OBJECTIVES IMPACTS
ECONOMIC
Assessed value and tax base expansion Proposed 2001 property assessment indicates
Positive impact on land values. marked increase in land values.
By year 2000, annual tax revenues projected to Additional tax revenue in 2000 of $3. lm
be $6.1 to $6.8m higher
Business and Economic Development Capital Center district has become highest
To improve the city's competitive position as a office rent district in Rhode Island
location for commercial development by While additional Class A office development is
building first class office space anticipated, the district has become mixed use
with retail as a major component.
$603,000,000m private investment to date.
Employment
Estimate 4800 jobs created by new
development, adding an estimated $49.7m to
the annual payroll by 2000
URBAN DESIGN and DEVELOPMENT Vehicular and pedestrian circulation improved
Circulation and Accessibility over existing conditions, but concerns remain
To improve vehicular and pedestrian regarding pedestrian environment.
circulation between the project area and the
State House, and downtown.
Identity and linkage Successful establishment of visual identity with
To establish a special visual identity for Waterplace Park and distinctive mall.
downtown Providence and to create a visual Low density and inconsistent design is an
and physical linkage between downtown and issue.
the State House.
The importance of an improved visual identity was mentioned not only by city officials
but also by representatives of various community development corporations and
institutions. The project "has been successful in terms of redefining Providence"
(Interview with Barges) and in giving the city a "better appearance and more competitive
advantage (Interview with Wills). Residents have a "greater sense of pride in the city"
and the revitalized downtown has "had a fabulous impact of what goes on in the state;
everyone wants to live in Rhode Island" (Interview with Karlin).
It is interesting to note that the early simple vision of creating an office district evolved
over time into a more complex plan that encompasses a mix of uses. Ultimately, this
development has allowed the area to play a broader economic role in the region. To date,
the development of Class A office space has been eclipsed by the mall construction
which arguably serves a greater number and broader section of the population than either
office or residential development.
A major concern however that surfaced during these interviews however was the
concentration of development in one area. For both city officials and community
representatives, the Capital Center project has diverted resources away from downtown
and away from the neighborhoods. The city has yet "to meet its objective for the rest of
downtown" with the Capital Center having "drained the energy of downtown" (Interview
with Shamoon). Interestingly, critics of the original plan expressed similar concerns but
supporters countered that "the construction of a 'new city' of office buildings will not
lead to the economic downfall of the 'old city" (Collins 11). Not only were there two
separate markets for the historic buildings and new ones, but the old core would have
almost a decade to capture demand for office space before development on the Capital
Center would begin (Collins 11). While the old core continues to boast a relative healthy
office market, the diversion of resources can be observed in its deteriorating
infrastructure, vacant retail spaces and departing businesses.
Although the original plan did not include the goal of linking development to the
downtown or neighborhoods explicitly - it merely referenced general improvements that
would occur in Providence's economy and the spillover effects that an expanded office
population would have on the downtown service and retail sectors - it can nevertheless
be critiqued for its failure to do so from the outset and from its failure to incorporate this
objective at a later date. As conditions deteriorated in the neighborhoods during the
eighties, the project proceeded on its original course (apart from the addition of the retail
component), and neglected to fully consider the impact on downtown and the
neighborhoods or examine how their needs might be met by development in the Capital
Center.
Thus, while the project can be judged a success to some extent in achieving many of its
objectives, not only are there issues with, for example, design and the pedestrian
environment, but there were serious omissions concerning assessing comprehensively the
project impacts and linking benefits to downtown and the neighborhoods.
CHAPTER 4
CONCLUSION and RECOMMENDATIONS
Revitalization
Successful downtown revitalization requires a careful synthesis of various factors that
seek to draw population back by highlighting the uniqueness of the place. By building on
its locational competitive advantage, eradicating blight, attracting investors, developing
employment opportunities, and creating public spaces and amenities, downtown can
reposition itself as the preferred location for mobile capital, workers, residents and
tourists. However, a healthy and thriving downtown does not merely encourage and rely
on centripetal forces, but must extend economic activity and benefits outwards in order to
sustain its own stability and to foster growth. A robust downtown will eventually decline
if surrounding neighborhoods, because of poor housing stock, lack of amenities and
crime, can not attract the labor and consumers to support this economy. In this sense,
neighborhoods and downtown have a symbiotic relationship and rather than viewing this
association as an antagonistic one, planning initiatives should seek to reinforce it.
In Providence, Rhode Island, downtown development has in many ways succeeded in
positioning the city as a regional economic center through the development of tourism
and service-based industries. The project has produced new economic activity through
attracting private investment, increasing property values, generating revenue, creating
employment opportunities and stimulating some investment and development adjacent to
the project area. Of particular note is that the Capital Center district has succeeded in
establishing itself as the prime location in Rhode Island for Class A office space and has
attracted suburban shoppers back to the downtown. With new development planned, the
District will be able to meet demand for quality commercial and residential space.
In addition, the project successfully transformed the landscape from one that was
cluttered with obsolete railroad infrastructure and parking lots which rendered it
unattractive and unsafe to one that is more accessible for automobiles and pedestrians and
offers a more pleasant environment. By engaging the rivers through walkways, bridges
and Waterplace Park, the city has created a significant public space that has both an
urban, suburban and national draw. The mall also seems to attract a diverse set of users
who can take advantage of a range of stores, a food court and an entertainment complex.
However, the findings suggest that though the project is incomplete, it has not met its full
potential in terms of generating new economic activity or in terms of creating an area
appropriate to the urban environment. It does not seem that the city is maximizing its
revenue from the Capital Center, particularly given the generous tax break to the mall
which, when annualized, exceeds the total annual tax revenue for the district. Moreover,
the costs of the project have been enormous and the data concerning the financing implies
that public investment has not, as of yet, resulted in leverage of private investment.
Design aspects of the project are also questionable in that the low density and space
between certain buildings give the district a suburban quality. In addition, the emphasis
on automobile access and circulation has to some extent compromised the pedestrian
experience.
Limitations of Corporate Center Approach
Perhaps the most troubling element of the project has been its failure to link the benefits
of development in the core in a direct and systematic manner to the neighborhoods,
particularly low-income communities. As city and state planning efforts have focused on
the Capital Center district, in the absence of formal mechanisms to provide community
benefits, resources have been diverted away from neighborhood development. The
impact of persistent disinvestment in neighboring communities has been exacerbated by
the lack of employment opportunities created within the district for residents of these
neighborhoods. Although the Providence Place Training Initiative sought to place
residents at the mall, it did not meet its objectives. Moreover, lower paid less skilled
service jobs such as those at the mall and hotels are not adequate replacements for the
jobs lost with the decline of the manufacturing industry.
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With its focus on an upscale environment that provides opportunities in the service sector
weighted towards middle and upper income employees, the Capital Center project in
many ways typifies the corporate center approach to downtown development. The
revitalization effort focused on symbolic enhancement of the business climate by
committing massive public funds to infrastructure development as a means to attracting
private investment. The resulting ostentatious development would, its supporters asserted,
create jobs, broaden the tax base and stimulate economic growth throughout the city.
The Need for Neighborhood Development
The corporate center approach however was flawed from the outset. First, in focusing on
the service sector as a replacement for manufacturing, the approach offered limited
opportunities at the citywide level and ensured an inequitable distribution of economic
benefits. The eagerness of the city to embrace office development tied into its willingness
to relinquish the manufacturing industry. While some shrinkage of manufacturing was
unavoidable, the city did not fully explore ways to retain some sectors as an option to
preserving a diversity of economic uses and better paying jobs. Second, in failing to
examine how development in the center could be linked to development needs in
surrounding areas, and in relying on the trickledown effect, the city's plan ensured
spatially uneven economic development.
The focus on the downtown has reduced the capacity of the city and private sector to
undertake development in the neighborhoods and has delivered benefits that primarily
target a narrow sector of the population. The disparity in resource allocation and
development is not sustainable. As the downtown continues to receive investment, the
concurrent neighborhood decline will ultimately undermine the gains achieved at the
center:
The long-term sustainability of Providence's community revival will depend
on the ability to revitalize the neighborhoods and communities which surround
the core. Inattention to the neighborhoods will eventually erode the work done
at the core. (Empowerment Zone Application 10)
Clearly, Providence could benefit from reconsidering the issue of neighborhood
development in relation to downtown and waterfront focused efforts. In addition to the
remaining development in the Capital Center District, the Downcity and New Cities
initiatives provide an opportunity for the city to address neighborhoods needs in a more
direct and formal way.
The New Cities initiative in particular has the potential to positively impact low-income
communities since it proposes physical redevelopment that extends into these
neighborhoods. The project plans to redevelop more than 500 acres of deteriorated
industrial property adjacent to the Capital Center district, create 30,000 new jobs and
generate more than $100 million in taxes (City of Providence 1). The Promenade site
extends from Providence Place Mall to Olneyville Square and the Westminster Crossing
site would link downtown to Federal Hill, the West End and South Providence.
However, this ambitious undertaking presents a number of issues. The project, which
includes 7 million gross square feet of new office space, four new hotels with 1,254
rooms, 400,000 square feet of new trail space and 4,335 new residential units, will
require massive investment. Not only has the city declined to estimate the total cost or
how it would fund it (Grillo Fl), but it is also unclear if the market could absorb this
amount of new development. In addition, the upscale nature of the development, which
features a marina and a seven-acre series of formal gardens might preclude low-income
communities from accessing newly created opportunities.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations are intended to provide guidelines for current and future
development in Providence. While these suggestions range from focusing on
neighborhood revitalization, to improving project tracking, to investing in Downcity, the
emphasis is placed on the city to assume more of an active role in overseeing
development that delivers benefits at the citywide level.
Focus on Neighborhood Development
The corporate center approach of recent downtown development in Providence has
negatively impacted adjacent neighborhoods. It is suggested that the city rethinks its
policy towards neighborhood development and, through the implementation of indirect
and direct mechanisms, assists low income communities in particular.
> Establish Formal Hiring Requirements
In order to link the new economic activity in the center to neighborhoods, the city
should establish formal contracting and hiring requirements for projects that have
utilized direct or indirect sources of city funding. As such, all projects - ranging from
those that receive Community Development Block Grants to those that receive tax
breaks - would be required to hire minority and female city residents as a set
percentage of their contractors and workforce participants.
> Institutional Support and Program Development
So that neighborhood residents may take full advantage of new contracting and
employment opportunities, the city should support institutions engaged in capacity
and skill development. The experience of the Providence Place Mall demonstrated not
only that minority contracting firms lack the equity and capacity to compete for large
projects but that segments of the workforce require substantial training to be eligible
for even low-skilled service sector jobs. By supporting local community focused
institutions such as the Minority Investment Development Corporation, the
Providence Plan, and local CDCs, and by helping forge partnerships with local
colleges, the city can ensure that hiring and contracting goals are met with residents
who are competent and job ready.
> Review Formal Neighborhood Benefit Requirement
The city should assess whether it is in a position to require private provision of public
benefits such as impact fees, inclusionary zoning and other community benefits.
Development to this date has not conferred substantial community gains; indeed, the
city sought a very narrow set of benefits that were mainly on-site in exchange for
public assistance and funding. The undeveloped parcels in the Capital Center as well
as the New Cities Initiative could provide an opportunity for the city to leverage more
from developers.
> Emphasize neighborhood revitalization
Although the Providence Plan, MIDC and various CDCs, continue to work on
neighborhood development, the City's focus on large scale downtown development
has diverted resources from low-income communities in particular. Before embarking
on the costly New Cities Initiative, the city should assess neighborhoods needs and
devise a series of well-organized strategies for revitalization. These should include
examining program, place-based as well as innovative approaches to economic
development.
> Collaborate with Community Development Corporations
By virtue of their location and objectives, the various CDCs in Providence each have
a unique understanding of needs and opportunities in their neighborhoods. The City
should take advantage of the CDC network in a number of ways. First, by involving
CDCs at an early stage in downtown development initiatives, the City can connect
neighborhoods to the core, thereby conferring benefits and fostering a sense of
neighborhood ownership over downtown. Second, by capitalizing on the local
knowledge of CDCs, the City can more effectively support economic development in
the neighborhoods. For example, both West Elmwood and Olneyville Housing
Development Corporations have revitalization plans that need city support. In
Olneyville, the CDC director is assessing how conversion of mill buildings can take
advantage of development pressures in other parts of the city that are forcing out the
arts community, as well as meet the needs of the neighborhood.
Improve Project Assessment
> Measure Costs and Benefits
As with the multitude of similar downtown development projects that proliferated
during the eighties and nineties, Providence has not undertaken a systematic effort to
measure the benefits of the project against the substantial public and social costs.
Although performing a comprehensive social cost-benefit analysis can prove to be an
immense and complicated task, the massive cost of the project should warrant this
assessment. The city should consider undertaking such an analysis for the New Cities
Initiative given the scope and nature of this project.
> Establish objectives for public leverage of private investment
It is advisable that the city thoroughly assesses the level of public investment in the
Capital Center project in relation to the amount of private investment it was intended
to leverage. It is critical to examine all forms of public subsidies, including tax breaks
such as those granted to the mall and to separate out public funding that was not
designed to directly generate private investment. This analysis could guide future
development deals in which public subsidies are required to attract private investors.
> Review benchmarks and track data
The city should track the performance of public private development projects
according to established benchmarks. In the case of the Capital Center, the project has
not generated the revenue anticipated. However, city officials have commented on the
project success in this respect without referencing goals or actual revenue received. In
order to ensure that the project is achieving its full potential, the city should review its
performance annually according to benchmarks.
In addition, the city has neglected to track critical employment and income data for
the project area that would allow more thorough assessment of the project. For
projects that receive public funding in particular, such as the Providence Place Mall,
it is recommended that the city compile and follow-up on data relating to employee
place of residence, ethnicity and wage. Collection and analysis of this data is essential
to understanding the extent to which downtown development is driving economic
development at the citywide level.
Link Future Development to Citywide Needs
> Diversify Capital Center development
The undeveloped parcels in the Capital Center District provide an opportunity for the
city to diversify the provision of project benefits and to more effectively link
economic activity in the core to the neighborhoods. By requiring mixed income
housing in new residential construction and by establishing contracting and hiring
goals, for example, the city can ensure that the new development targets a broader
segment of the population, particularly low income residents.
> Invest in Downcity revitalization
The revitalization of the Downcity area, with its historic buildings and densely
arranged mix of uses, has the potential to transform Providence into an economic and
cultural center for the region. Although initiatives are underway to revitalize this area,
they are inadequate and pale in comparison to the resources invested in the Capital
Center project. It is recommended that the city reassesses its level of commitment to
the Downcity area. Underlying this commitment should be the promotion of small
business ownership and the encouragement of diverse uses and users, both of which
currently characterize the area.
> Examine alternatives to New Cities Initiative
Implementation of the ambitious New Cities Initiative would certainly transform
Providence, but the question remains as to whether this plan is financially feasible or
desirable. It is unclear if Providence can access a similar level of public funds that
proved necessary for the Capital Center project. Analysis of the Capital Center
project has shown that the city has not achieved its core goals of substantially
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increasing tax revenue and leveraging significant private investment, despite the
massive commitment of public funds. Based on this experience, it is unlikely that the
New Cities initiative could reach its stated economic goals. Moreover, it is unclear if
the initiative would alleviate conditions in the city's poorer neighborhoods or simply
continue the disinvestment that has occurred over the last twenty years.
Rather than investing in such massive redevelopment, perhaps the city should
consider investing in improving the overall quality of life in Providence. By offering
a more qualified workforce, enhanced public services and superior infrastructure, the
city might be in a better position to attract investors.
) Assess competitive advantages
The decline of the manufacturing sector represented a loss of the city's competitive
advantage as well as employment opportunities. The city should assess its
competitive advantages and determine opportunities for growth in sectors that can
offer quality employment creation. Clearly, more research is needed in this respect,
but the concentration of educational and health industries in the downtown area offer
possibilities for strengthening clusters and developing collaborations.
Focus on quality employment creation
The challenge for the city is to create quality employment opportunities that will
serve as adequate replacements for the jobs lost as a result of the decline of the
manufacturing sector.
To date, many of the opportunities accessible to low or moderate income
neighborhood residents have consisted of lower paying less skilled service jobs. The
upcoming projects in the Capital Center and New Cities Initiative seem to reinforce
this pattern by emphasizing upscale service based uses. Without workforce
development initiatives, it is likely that the only opportunities for poor neighborhood
residents will fall within the same category. By focusing on the creation of quality
employment opportunities, and by offering training programs directed toward linking
young neighborhood residents to these new jobs, the city will promote a more
equitable distribution of economic benefits.
> Review tax assessment practices
It is recommended that, in light of revenue lost and in anticipation of further large-
scale development in the downtown area, the city work closely with the state to
establish a more frequent and accurate property assessment. By collecting additional
tax revenue, the city could allocate increased funding public services. While the 1997
legislation, which enacted a nine-year evaluation with two statistical updates,
represents an improvement over the previous ten-year assessment cycle, there
remains enough flexibility in the law for communities to delay reassessment and
forfeit possible revenue gains realized from increased property values. As a guideline,
Rhode Island could examine Massachusetts practices where tax assessments are
conducted every three years.
Lessons for Urban Development
The experience of Providence in attempting to revitalize its downtown provides a number
of lessons that might be of use to other cities facing similar urban development issues.
> Creating a Destination Center
The Capital Center project highlighted the importance of creating a destination center
through the provision of retail facilities and recreational/cultural amenities. The retail
component has not only lured suburban shoppers back to the city but it has also
attracted a diverse set of urban users. Moreover, the revitalized riverfront area and
associated festivals enjoy a regional and even national draw. By focusing on the
position of downtown as a regional center for arts, culture, entertainment and
recreation, cities can enjoy the benefits of increased economic activity and renewed
prestige.
Encouraging a Mix of Concentrated Uses and Pedestrian Friendly Environment
The modification of the original office-oriented Capital Center plan to include retail
allowed Providence to develop a mixed-use district that has contributed to 24-hour
activity and a diverse set of users. By adopting a flexible approach to land use, the
city was able to add the Providence Place Mall, a development which has proved to
be a vital component to the district and which will compliment the future arts and
entertainment development planned for Downcity. The Capital Center District
however has failed thus far to develop the intensity that arises from concentrated uses
and an environment friendly to pedestrians.
As cities continue to devise strategies to compete with suburbs, proposing a mix of
concentrated uses in the downtown is essential to recapturing the position that
downtowns once played as regional centers for economic and cultural activity.
Inherent in this concept is an understanding that concentrated activity distinguishes
the urban from the suburban and that the pedestrian plays a key role in contributing to
the dynamism of the downtown environment.
Reversal of physical characteristics of blight and image enhancement
The importance of reversing the physical aspects of blight can not be underestimated.
Providence's ability to transform the Capital Center not only improved the business
climate and attracted new users to the area but also clearly redefined the image of the
city and positively impacted the perception of residents and visitors.
While cities may not be able to access the same level of public funding for such large-
scale projects as the Capital Center, cities can still overcome the physical
characteristics of blight. By making smaller scale improvements to infrastructure,
storefronts, streetscapes and by investing in business development, cities can enhance
the downtown environment. Tools to implement these improvements might include
establishing Business Improvement Districts and following the Main Streets program.
In addition, cities can ensure design integrity by granting design and development
oversight to a committee.
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Diversifying the Economic Base and Assessing Competitive Advantage
As cities continue to deal with the transition from traditional manufacturing to the
newer more advanced economy, the need to maintain a diverse economic base remains
a central issue. In adopting the Corporate Center approach, Providence neglected to
fully consider how retaining manufacturing sectors and the associated better paying
jobs would confer benefits at the citywide level. The focus on tourism-convention and
service industries has targeted benefits to a narrow segment of the population and
negatively impacted the opportunities of residents from low-income communities in
particular to access economic gains from the new development.
By assessing the city's competitive advantages and basing a strategy for diversifying
the economic base on this understanding, cities can not only compete more effectively
with suburbs but can also sustain the gains of new economic activity. While the
service sector is an important component of the local economy, developing and
supporting the manufacturing industry should remain a goal for cities that seek to
deliver a broad set of benefits from downtown development.
Investing in Workforce development
Diversifying the economic base is only one side of the economic development
equation; as new opportunities are created, cities need to ensure that residents, in
particular those from low income communities can access employment. Although the
city of Providence supported a training initiative for the new retail development, not
only did it lack enforcement measures but it also prepared residents for the lowest
paid service sector jobs.
By investing in workforce development, cities can link areas of need to areas of
opportunity. By increasing median income levels in poor neighborhoods, the benefits
of downtown development will have successfully trickled down and reduced income
disparities at the citywide level.
Neighborhood Revitalization - acknowledging the tension with downtown
development
The need to engage in neighborhood revitalization is clear if cities are to reassert their
positions of regional dominance. By neglecting to invest adequately in its
neighborhoods and in channeling its resources towards downtown without establishing
mechanisms that would distribute benefits at the citywide level, Providence ensured
uneven economic development and further neighborhood deterioration that could
destabilize the gains achieved at the core.
However, while the debate concerning urban development should not be framed in
terms of the downtown versus the neighborhoods and instead should recognize the
symbiotic relationship of the two, there is nevertheless a tension that arises from the
scarcity of resources. Where cities can not directly allocate resources to both
downtown and neighborhood development, the need to ensure that benefits of new
economic activity generated by downtown development are linked to the
neighborhoods assumes more importance.
Project evaluation - ex ante and post
The experience of downtown development in Providence highlights the importance of
project evaluation. While the Capital Center plan identified objectives in the
conceptual stage, the city failed to perform adequate impact assessment before project
implementation and neglected to evaluate the project in relation to its stated and more
broadly defined goals. As such, the city has overstated the success of the development.
Where cities allocate public resources to downtown development, assessing potential
impacts, identifying alternatives, establishing sensible objectives, tracking data and
analyzing effects on neighborhoods in particular, should be a central goal of the
project. Without this knowledge, cities lack accountability to the public and are likely
to repeat costly mistakes.
> Ensuring the Interests of the Public Sector
The need to ensure that the public sector's interests are upheld is critical to fostering
development that delivers benefits at the citywide level. The Capital Center project has
not, as of yet, resulted in a strong net fiscal benefit to the city. By offering a considerable
tax break to the mall project, which on an annual basis exceeds tax revenue from the
district, the city is not maximizing its potential to gain economically from development in
the district. Moreover, by failing to reassess property on a more frequent basis, the city
has essentially subsidized private development and caused greater inequity in property
values at time when it is making large public investments. And, when the level of private
investment in the Capital Center project is gauged, it is exceeded by the level of public
expenditures, resulting in negative leverage of public sector funds.
Cities seeking to invest in large scale or indeed small-scale projects need to carefully
consider the costs and benefits of public investments and to establish clear benchmarks
regarding private sector investment. Cities should include in this analysis public
expenditures on items that often are overlooked such as infrastructure improvements and
tax breaks. In addition, given that a primary goal of downtown redevelopment is to
increase property values, cities should ensure that they are capturing the fiscal benefit of
this change by reviewing tax assessment policies and establishing frequent reevaluations.
Towards a New Model for Downtown Development
The issue of who benefits from downtown development formed the central inquiry
behind this investigation. The premise that the benefits of downtown development should
extend to neighborhoods through the diversification of the economic base leads to a
rejection of the corporate center approach as well as to the identification of a broader set
of goals. How cities define the incidence of benefits thus becomes a critical factor in
determining the direction in which downtown development proceeds. In assuming a
comprehensive approach to revitalization that includes physical and economic
improvements, this study has attempted to outline a model that links the downtown to
neighborhood development, as demonstrated in the flow chart below which is explained
in Chapter 1:
Figure 4.1: Indicators of Revitalization
Project:
- Accomplishment of
city officials objectives
DOWNTOWN Physical
Transformation
-Public space and
amenities
NEIGHBORHOOD Extent to which
residents access new
uses
By setting these downtown and neighborhood-focused outcomes as goals, cities can
establish a framework for planning as well as evaluating downtown development. This
framework is one that should propose a mix of uses and industries in the downtown and
should also provide neighborhood residents with access to the economic and social
opportunities created by new development.
Generate New
Economic Activity
- Private investment
- Increase property
values
- Generate revenue
- New employment
- Formal hirings and
community benefits
- Contribution to equitable
spatial allocation of resources
~
residents 
access new
uses
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APPENDIX A: Providence Downtown and Neighborhoods
Source: Brown University
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APPENDIX B: Capital Center Project Boundaries and Parcel Plan
Source: Capital Center Commission
APPENDIX C:
STATUS OF CAPITAL CENTER DEVELOPMENT PARCELS (2001)
Parcel Site Sq Ft Completed/ Current Status Projected
1 204,552 Restoration of former train station into office 230,000 sq ft of building for office, retail
and restaurant space (150,000 sq ft). Interim and/or residential
parking for 60 cars
2 91,228 225 room Hilton, 150 condominium units,
(A & B) 100,000 sq ft office, 450-500 parking spaces.
Break ground in Fall 2001 (per broker)
3E 23,782 Interim parking for 90 cars 190 residential apartments presently under
design review
3S 40,033 Citizens Plaza: 13 story, 234,000 sq ft office
building with ground floor retail
3W 34,967 Interim parking for 90 cars 350,000 sq ft office building/parking
4E 22,360 Interim parking for 70 cars 360 car garage presently under design review
4W 46,329 Interim parking for 70 cars Apartment building on 4E and 4W: 20 stories,
185 units. Close to final approval
5 54,042 Center Place: 8 story, 225 luxury residential
apartments; 450 underground structured
parking garage
6A, A: 276,037 Interim surface parking 4-story 1200 parking garage; townhouses,
B&C B: 87,120 offices and/or retail
C: 43,560
7 53,339 Amtrak Railroad Station; 360 underground
parking garage
8 36,170 Gateway (former American Express)
building: 4 story, 110,000 sq ft office
building, 150 underground parking spaces
9 71,902 200,000 sq ft office, 70,000 sq ft retail, 265
car garage. Pending approval by the Capital
Center Commission.
10 564,097 Providence Place Mall: 1,200,000 sq ft retail
& 13 and 4,000 structures parking spaces
11 158,356 Portion of Convention Center Complex: 363 350 room hotel or 256,000 sq ft office
room Westin Hotel and office complex, 1,700 building
structured parking spaces
12 24,249 Specialty hotel with upper level condos.
14 97,140 Restoration/reuse of Masonic Temple as
Renaissance Marriott Hotel
15 90,262 Office space with ground level support retail
Land Use Summary
Use Completed Sq Ft/ Units Projected Total
Retail 1,200,000 70,000 1,270,000
Office 494,000 550,000 1,044,000
Housing 225 525 750
Hotel 363 225 588
Parking ,6,660 2,275 8,935
Source: Capital Center Commission
To be determined:
230,000 office, retail and/or residential
townhouses
350 room hotel or 256,000 sq ft office bldg
Additional office space
Specialty hotel with upper level condos
APPENDIX D: IMAGES of PRE and POST REVITALIZATION
Providence, Rhode Island
Exhibit 1: River Relocation Plan
----- former route
source: -'rovialence founaation
oource: rrovluence rounuaILon
Exhibit 2: Pre Revitalization
Former station, switching yards and elevated tracks
_ I_ __ I _I_ __I_·_· _·_
source: Providence Foundation
Exhibit 3: Pre Revitalization
Aerial View of Central Business District, Capital Center and State House
Exhibit 4: Post Revitalization
Axial View to the State House from Francis Street
Exhibit 5: Post Revitalization
Skybridge link between Providence Place Mall and Westin Hotel
Exhibit 6: Post Revitalization
American Express building: low density and suburban setting
-----.~·r;_· ~C~-i^ -- -- · ---- ~----
---
Exhibit 7: Dense urban and historic environment
of Downcity
Exhibit 8: Deteriorating facades and vacant stores in Downcity
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APPENDIX E: OFFICE RENT ANALYSIS for CAPITAL CENTER and CENTRAL BUSINESS DISTRICT
(2000 and 1998)
Rent/Sq Weighted %
Street Address Sq Ft Ft Average Vacant
1 Citizens Plaza 212,782 $ 32.00 $ 6,809,024 4.7
30 Exchange Terrace 24,900 $ 20.00 $ 498,000 0
36 Exchange Terrace 16,818 $ 21.00 $ 353,178 0
50 Exchange Terrace 16,992 $ 21.00 $ 356,832 0
56 Exchange Terrace 36,710 $ 23.00 $ 844,330 0
Total 308,202 $ 23.40 $ 28.75
Rent/Sq Weighted %
Street Address Sq Ft Ft Average Vacant
15 LaSalle Square 137,000 $ 19.00 $ 2,603,000 0
50 Kennedy Plaza 386,500 $ 26.50 $ 10,242,250 10.3
Providence Washington 140,000 $ 27.00 $ 3,780,000 0
15 Westminster Street 222,000 $ 17.50 $ 3,885,000 4.5
1 Financial Plaza 323,000 $ 25.50 $ 8,236,500 4.1
40 Westminster Street 263,086 $ 24.00 $ 6,314,064 0.5
76 Westminster Street 150,500 $ 17.50 $ 2,633,750 8
170 Westminster Street 57,043 $ 17.00 $ 969,731 14.2
10 Weybosset Street 125,000 $ 25.00 $ 3,125,000 8.3
Total 1,804,129 $ 22.11 $ 23.16
Weighted %
Street Address Sq Ft Rent/Sq Ft Average Vacant
1 Citizens Plaza 212,782 $ 30.50 $ 6,489,851 3.8
30 Exchange Terrace 24,900 $ 17.00 $ 423,300 0
36 Exchange Terrace 16,818 $ 18.50 $ 311,133 0
40 Exchange Terrace 46,291 $ 27.00 $ 1,249,857 0
50 Exchange Terrace 16,992 $ 18.00 $ 305,856 20.6
56 Exchange Terrace 36,710 $ 19.00 $ 697,490 20.4
Total 354,493 $ 21.67 $ 26.74
Weighted %
Street Address Sq Ft Rent/Sq Ft Average Vacant
1 Hospital Trust Plaza 222,000 $ 16.50 $ 3,663,000 4.5
1 Hospital Trust Plaza 323000 $ 24.50 $ 7,913,500 9.3
15 LaSalle Square 137,000 $ 19.00 $ 2,603,000 0
50 Kennedy Plaza 386,500 $ 26.00 $ 10,049,000 13.5
Providence Washington 140,000 $ 24.00 $ 3,360,000 11.4
40 Westminster Street 263,086 $ 21.00 $ 5,524,806 1.3
170 Westminster Street 57,043 $ 17.00 $ 969,731 6.1
10 Weybosset Street 130,000 $ 22.00 $ 2,860,000 23.5
Total 1,658,629 $ 21.25 $ 22.27
I I I I - -- ·
APPENDIX E: OFFICE RENT ANALYSIS for CAPITAL CENTER and CENTRAL BUSINESS DISTRICT
(1993 and 1988)
Weighted %
Street Address Sq Ft Rent/Sq Ft Average vacant
American Express Blvd 113,000 $ 27.00 $ 3,051,000 0
1 Citizens Plaza 212,782 $ 28.50 $ 6,064,287 23.6
30 Exchange Terrace 24,900 $ 17.00 $ 423,300 24.1
36 Exchange Terrace 16,818 $ 17.00 $ 285,906 31.8
40 Exchange Terrace 46,291 $ 21.00 $ 972,111 8.1
50 Exchange Terrace 16,992 $ 17.00 $ 288,864 31.7
56 Exchange Terrace 36,710 $ 19.00 $ 697,490 0
Total 467,493 $ 20.93 $ 25.20
Weighted %
Street Address Sq Ft Rent/Sq Ft Average vacant
10 Dorrance Street 188,000 $ 16.50 $ 3,102,000 0
1 Hospital Trust Plaza 222,000 $ 19.00 $ 4,218,000 4.5
1 Hospital Trust Plaza 323000 $ 24.50 $ 7,913,500 17.7
7 Jackson Walkway 77,500 $ 15.00 $ 1,162,500 0
15 LaSalle Square 137,000 $ 22.50 $ 3,082,500 16.1
50 Kennedy Plaza 386,500 $ 28.79 $ 11,127,335 13.1
40 Westminster Street 263,086 $ 21.00 $ 5,524,806 36.5
111 Westminster Street 310,000 $ 16.50 $ 5,115,000 0
170 Westminster Street 57,043 $ 17.50 $ 998,253 8.9
Total 1,964,129 $ 20.14 $ 21.51
Weighted %
Street Address Sq Ft Rent/Sq Ft Average vacant
36 Exchange Terrace 18,000 $ 24.50 $ 441,000 100
40 Exchange Terrace 33,000 $ 24.50 $ 808,500 100
50 Exchange Terrace 18,000 $ 24.50 $ 441,000 100
56 Exchange Terrace 38,000 $ 24.50 $ 931,000 78.9
Total 107,000 $ 24.50 $ 24.50
Weighted %
Street Address Sq Ft Rent/Sq Ft Average vacant
10 Dorrance Street 188,000 $ 17.25 $ 3,243,000 16
200 Dyer Street 36,000 $ 22.00 $ 792,000 34.2
1 Hospital Trust Plaza 222,000 $ 18.00 $ 3,996,000 2.4
1 Hospital Trust Plaza 323000 $ 24.50 $ 7,913,500 10.9
7 Jackson Walkway 77,500 $ 15.00 $ 1,162,500 0
15 LaSalle Square 137,000 $ 22.50 $ 3,082,500 0
50 Kennedy Plaza 358,000 $ 26.20 $ 9,379,600 7.5
76 Westminster Street 150,000 $ 18.50 $ 2,775,000 13.3
111 Westminster Street 310,000 $ 16.50 $ 5,115,000 0
170 Westminster Street 76,660 $ 19.00 $ 1,456,540 0
Total 1,878,160 $ 19.95 $ 20.72
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